Probably the majority of the great steam railroads, street railways, and gas companies that were organised during the last quarter of the nineteenth century inflated their capitalisation to a greater or less extent. Since the year 1900 the trusts have been the chief exponents and illustrations of the practice. According to President Van Hise, "the majority of the great concentrations of industry have gone through two or three stages of reorganisation, the promoters and financiers each time profiting greatly, sometimes enormously."[194] For example; in 1908 the "water" in the American Tobacco Company was estimated by the Commissioner of Corporations at $66,000,000; the United States Shipbuilding Company diluted its twelve and one-half million dollars of capital with more than fifty-five millions of "water"; the United States Steel Corporation contained at the time of its organisation fictitious capital to the amount of $500,000,000; and at least fifty per cent. of the common stock of the American Sugar Refining Company represented no actual investment.[195] Owing to the penetrating and widespread criticism, and the government investigations and prosecutions of the last few years, the practice of stockwatering has very greatly diminished. Perhaps the most flagrant recent example is that of the Pullman Company, which according to the testimony of R. T. Lincoln before the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, distributed among its stockholders $100,000,000 in stock dividends between 1898 and 1910.
Nevertheless the temptation to inflate capital will exist until the device is stringently prohibited by law. Both the nation and the states ought to adopt the policy of forbidding the sale of stock at less than par value, and restricting issues of stock to the amount required for the establishment, equipment, and permanent betterment of a concern, including a sum to cover the loss of interest to the investors during the early period of the business. Any extraordinary risks to which an enterprise is liable can be protected by the simple device of allowing a correspondingly high rate of interest on the securities. With such legislation enacted and enforced, neither the investor nor the consumer could be deceived or defrauded; and the financing and management of corporations would become less speculative, and more beneficial to the community. The present chapter may be fittingly closed with a moderate and significant statement from the pen of Professor Taussig: "It is doubtful whether the whole mechanism of irregular and swollen capitalisation was at any time necessary or wise. Why not provide once for all that securities shall be issued only to represent what has been invested?... It is sometimes said that freedom, even recklessness, in the issue of securities was a useful device, in that it enabled the projectors to look forward to returns really tempting, and at the same time concealed these returns from a grudging public.... A more simple and straightforward way of dealing with the issue of securities might thus have dampened in some degree the feverish speculation and restless progress of railway development. But a slower pace would have had its advantages also, and, not least, restriction of securities would have saved great complications in the later stages of established monopoly and needed regulation."[196]