Thus it appears that it is not so much that universal care of a Father, that makes the _Popes_ maintain a good correspondence with Christian Princes; as the fear of leaving Enemies to their Families, and bringing ruine upon their Relations.
We all know that every _Pope_ either out of envy or some other motive is well pleased to lessen, if not utterly to destroy the Family of his Predecessor; and of this we have had many experiences since two ages. Therefore also the _Popes_, to prevent this misfortune, do ordinarily endeavour to get, while they are alive, the protection of some eminent Christian Prince, for their Family; under whose wings they may shelter themselves in a time of calamity.
And if this be, we may conclude, that all the affection, the care, and the desire which the _Popes_ have of advancing their Kindred, does at last turn to a general benefit and profit for Christendom; and if you except one inconvenience, which is, that they impoverish the Church, and carry away all its treasure, it were and is better for all other considerations, that the _Popes_ do govern conjoyntly with their _Nipotismo_, than without it: which is proved by a third reason; which is, that without a _Nipotismo_ the Negotiations and business of the Court could never be carried with secresie enough.
I am in doubt whether it be harder to keep a thing secret in the Court of a Prince, than in the Council of a Commonwealth; for in the Commonwealth the great number of Counsellors make the keeping of a Secret a very difficult thing: and in the Court of Princes, the envy of those Courtiers, who are excluded from the management of Affairs, is so sharp-sighted, and does so pry and penetrate into the most hidden Mysteries of the Court, to the end they may either hurt the Prince through his Counsellors, or the Counsellors through the Prince, that it is almost impossible to keep any thing hidden from them.
I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy.