Here is a concise account of the attack. After the unsuccessful sortie of Osman Pasha on August 31, in which the Russians recovered all the positions temporarily occupied by the enemy, there was a partial cessation of hostilities before Plevna until September 6. Meanwhile, on the 3rd, a force of 22,000 Russians under Meretinsky, including a brigade of Cossacks commanded by Skobeleff, succeeded, after a sanguinary conflict, in driving 7,000 Turks from the village of Loftcha and a defensive position west of it, which they permanently occupied.[183] This operation had the effect of cutting off the supplies of Osman Pasha from the south. An artillery duel then followed between the whole of the attacking and defending armies, which lasted until the 11th, and, judging from the long and careful accounts of the correspondents, the firing seems to have had little effect on either side. In the interim the Roumanians were posted opposite the Grivitza Redoubt, which, as we have already said, was the most formidable of all the Turkish defences. Meretinsky and Skobeleff were in the vicinity of the Loftcha road; and Kriloff and Krüdener were moving about in co-operation, the former having posted himself on the Radisovo height with the forces under his command.[184] Of the Grivitza and the Roumanian operations we shall speak more fully hereafter. At the other points of attack nothing serious happened until the 11th, when, a general assault being ordered, the attack of Kriloff and Krüdener was directed against a position known as the 'Mamelon,' south of Plevna, whilst Skobeleff made a vigorous assault upon a double redoubt on the south-east, the object being to carry these positions which were believed to be the most vulnerable, whilst the Roumanians were 'holding' the Turks at their strongest redoubt--the Grivitza. Supported by Roumanian artillery, Kriloff attacked the 'Mamelon' three times during the day, each time with fresh forces; but he was as often repulsed with terrible loss, the third attack and defeat lasting only twenty minutes. In fact, Kriloff and Krüdener were repulsed all along the line. Skobeleff was somewhat more fortunate, having begun his attack after Kriloff's second reverse. With a loss of 2,000 men he succeeded in carrying the Turkish position; and at a further sacrifice of 3,000 he held it for a time only, for it was commanded by the Krishine redoubt (which was the ultimate object of his operations) on his left, and by Plevna on the north. The Turks attempted in vain five times to dislodge him. Skobeleff supplicated time after time for support, but it only arrived when, after the sixth Turkish attack--this time successful--he had been forced to withdraw, and was retreating to his old ground. The closing scene of his day's operations has been frequently described, but as his recent escapade gives fresh interest to anything concerning him, it will lose nothing by repetition: 'It was just after this that I met General Skobeleff the first time that day. He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth, his sword broken, his cross of St. George twisted round on his shoulder, his face black with powder and smoke, his eyes haggard and bloodshot, and his voice quite gone. He spoke in a, hoarse whisper. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said, "I have done my best. I could do no more. My detachment is half destroyed; my regiments do not exist. I have no officers left. They sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns." They were three of the four guns which he placed in the redoubt upon taking it, only one of which his retreating troops had been able to carry off. "Why did they refuse you reinforcements?" I asked. "Who was to blame?" "I blame nobody," he replied; "it is the will of God!"'[185]