The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice HARLAN, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice GOLDBERG, dissenting.
An examination of the proceedings in this case convinces us that a summary disposition of this matter is not appropriate.
In 1955 the Government brought an antitrust action against appellant Columbia, appellant Community Concerts, Inc. (Columbia's wholly owned subsidiary), and two corporations whose successor is appellee Summy-Birchard, Inc. Columbia and Summy-Birchard manage professional concert artists, and their affiliates, Community and the Civic Concert Service division of Summy-Birchard, are 'concert services,' organizing and maintaining local nonprofit 'audience associations' throughout the country which sponsor concert series. Normally an audience association pays an artist an established fee set by the artist and his manager, out of which the artist's manager retains a share and the concert service also retains a share known as the 'margin.' The Government's complaint charged a conspiracy to monopolize the business of managing and booking concert artists and the business of forming and maintaining audience associations.
On October 20, 1955, a consent decree was entered by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the terms of which provide that the managing companies must make their artists available to all concert services at the same rate and that the concert services must make performers available to audience associations without reference to the management of the artists. Paragraph VI(D) of the decree requires that each defendant make available 'to any financial responsible concert service any artist managed by such defendant and reasonably available for the desired performance, at the same margin allowed to the defendant or its affiliate concert service by that artist for a performance for the same fee.'
Columbia's standard contract with concert services contains a provision, which Columiba argues is required by a collective bargaining agreement among managers and the concert artists' union, prohibiting a concert service from booking an engagement at less than the artist's established fee without the consent of the artist. After Summy-Birchard protested against signing contracts containing this provision on the ground that it constituted illegal resale price maintenance, Columbia petitioned the District Court on July 18, 1963, for a construction of the 1955 consent decree, alleging in part that the decree specifically sanctioned this contract provision and thus insulated it from attack by a party to the decree. The Government and Summy-Birchard were joined as parties. The District Court held that this contract provision prevented competition among concert services, for it required all of them to be paid the same 'margin' for each artist, and concluded that such a provision was illegal. After reargument, the District Court reaffirmed its prior opinion and stated in its final order:
'The provision in Columbia's contract * * * that each engagement before an audience association shall be performed at the artist's established fee constitutes illegal resale price maintenance and is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). To the extent that the Final Judgment operates to allow Columbia to set such resale prices, it is illegal and void as contrary to the Sherman Act, and any continued reliance by Columbia upon such portion or portions of the Final Judgment will not be construed by the Court to be in any way valid.'
Columbia appeals from this judgment claiming that it constitutes a modification of the 1955 consent decree and that the District Court is without power to modify the decree without Columbia's agreement.
In our view there is substance to Columbia's contention that the District Court modified the 1955 consent decree. As we read the District Court's opinion, that court held that the 1955 decree affirmatively sanctioned the use of the contract provision, and then went on to modify the decree, invalidating that portion of the decree which permitted Columbia to include the provision at issue in its contracts. The District Judge stated in his original opinion: