“Whenever any person, convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of any crime, shall be sentenced to imprisonment in any penitentiary of the State, the court, instead of pronouncing upon such convict a definite or fixed term of imprisonment, shall pronounce upon such convict a sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite term; stating in such sentence the minimum and maximum limits thereof; and the maximum limit shall never exceed the maximum time now or hereafter prescribed as a penalty for such offense: Provided, That no person sentenced for an indeterminate term shall be entitled to any benefits under the act, entitled ‘An act providing for the commutation of sentences for good behavior of convicts in prisons, penitentiaries, workhouses and county jails in this State, and regulations governing the same,’ approved the eleventh day of May, Anno Domini one thousand nine hundred and one.”
It will be seen that this amendment puts it into the power of the _court_ to fix _any_ minimum below the maximum, instead of a minimum not exceeding one fourth of the maximum; that it permits the court to name a lower maximum than the one now prescribed by law for any given offense; and that it strikes out the thirty-year clause altogether.
The practical effect of the former change is to destroy in great measure the value and efficacy of the indeterminate sentence as a remedial and reformatory measure. In other words, the amendment restores the vicious _inequality of sentences_, which is always so apt to breed a feeling of injustice and resentment in the one convicted, and which therefore greatly unfits him as a subject for reformatory treatment. It proceeds upon the long-accepted but false assumption that the court can in every case determine the exact degree of culpability and then adjust the punishment accurately to the crime. This is not only absurd, but it is impossible. A Solomon with all his wisdom could not have done this! As the law now stands, we shall again find, as is indeed already the case, that the same court or adjoining courts may, even under practically identical conditions, impose greatly varying sentences, instead of putting all upon whom sentence is passed on an equality and giving all, under identical conditions, an equal chance, as the law originally contemplated. Thus since the amended law went into effect sentences like these have been pronounced: Minimum 5 years, maximum 7; minimum 8 years, maximum 10; minimum 6 months, maximum 1 year; minimum 6 years, maximum 7; minimum 7 years, maximum 15. In two cases of burglary the one man received a minimum of 5 years, and a maximum of 10, but the other a minimum of only 2 years and a maximum of 5; while in another case an old crook, who had been convicted for the sixth time, and whose new crimes should have brought him a maximum sentence of 16 years, received a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 1 year. Since the law first went into effect several courts have also imposed flat sentences, without a minimum. This is clearly in conflict with the law, which is mandatory. It does seem as if courts that try and sentence lawbreakers should be the first to have a reverent regard for law!