Osoaviakhim-1 was a record-setting, hydrogen-filled Soviet high-altitude balloon designed to seat a crew of three and perform scientific studies of the Earth's stratosphere. On January 30, 1934, on its maiden flight, which lasted over 7 hours, the balloon reached an altitude of . During the descent the balloon lost its buoyancy and plunged into an uncontrolled fall, disintegrating in the lower atmosphere. The three crew members, probably incapacitated by high g-forces in a rapidly rotating gondola, failed to bail out and were killed by the high-speed ground impact.

According to public investigation reports, the crash was ultimately caused by a prolonged stay at record altitudes exceeding maximum design limits. The balloon, overheated by sunlight, lost too much lifting gas in the upper atmosphere. As it descended past the mark, cooling down to ambient air temperature, a rapid loss of buoyancy caused a downward acceleration that triggered the structural failure of the suspension cables. The aircraft design was marked by numerous engineering flaws, notably insufficient ballast and faulty gondola suspension design, which all contributed to the loss of life.

Osoaviakhim-1

Later Soviet manned high-altitude balloons improved on safety devices and did not venture above ; the program was nevertheless marked with accidents and failures and was terminated after the Osoaviakhim-2 launch failure in June 1940.

Osoaviakhim-1

Background

Auguste Piccard's high-altitude flights of 1930–1932 aroused interest of Soviet Air Forces and Osoaviakhim, the Soviet paramilitary training organization, as well as individual pilots, designers and flight enthusiasts. Andrey Vasenko, an engineer from the Institute of Aerial Photography in Leningrad, and a future crewmember of Osoaviakhim-1, designed his version of Piccard's balloon in 1930, however, Osoaviakhim delayed funding until the end of 1932.

Osoaviakhim-1

The second competing proposal, that of the national Meteorology Committee, emerged in January 1932 and was soon abandoned, also for the lack of finance. This allowed the third competitor, the Air Forces, a solid lead in time. USSR-1, the Air Forces stratospheric balloon, was designed by Georgy Prokofiev with assistance of Vladimir Chizhevsky, Konstantin Godunov and the Air Force Academy staff. Their balloon, built in Moscow by professional aircraft technicians, proved to be far safer than Vasenko's. It had two airtight hatches with fast-opening locks; ballast was carried externally and could be instantly released on demand. The gondola was reinforced with an internal and an external frame that prevented direct contact between the airtight compartment's skin and suspension cables. Osoaviakhim-1 lacked all these safety features.

Both the Osoaviakhim and the Air Forces program were primarily scientific, with expected practical applications in meteorology and future high-altitude airplanes. The Osoaviakhim program, in particular, was sponsored and consulted by Abram Ioffe of the Physical-Technical Institute; one of his postgraduate students, Ilya Usyskin, joined the crew of Osoaviakhim-1 and perished on its fatal flight.

Design flaws

The 24,940 cubic metre Osoaviakhim-1 was completed by Vasenko and Evgeniy Chertovsky in Leningrad in June 1933. With 2,460 kilograms gross weight at launch and 2,600 kilograms initial lifting force, it was expected to fully expand at 17,700 metres and reach static equilibrium at 19,500. Maximum altitude was initially set at 20,000 metres but the upgrades made during construction, according to Vasenko, enabled it to reach even higher.

In August the balloon was commissioned to fly despite known technical flaws. The commissioners emphasized that the crew, although equipped with personal parachutes, had little chance of bailing out in case of emergency: the sole airtight hatch was held in place with twelve wing nuts. Opening it, even on solid ground, required minutes. The crew did not wear pressure suits (which simply did not exist at that time) or individual breathing sets, relying on stored supplies of compressed oxygen and carbon dioxide absorber cartridges. Crew survival depended on the gondola's integrity; bailing out without breathing sets was feasible only at altitudes below 8,000 metres.

The gondola itself was welded from 0.8 millimetre sheet metal without any structural frame. In addition to the crew, instruments and life support systems, it carried a tonne of lead ballast inside the airtight sphere. The ballast release chute was sufficiently airtight but provided a very slow discharge rate: releasing a ton of ballast normally took a whole hour. In real flight this flaw alone would prevent the crew from slowing down the falling balloon despite having ballast on board.