Madison's policy would have been had he become
president under circumstances similar to those which Jefferson
encountered is uncertain. The Federalist press supposed that, as secretary of state, he opposed the proscriptive system, and at one time announced that he was on the point of resigning because of it; yet even if it were not to his liking, he might have been forced to practise it had he become chief magistrate in 1801. As it was, he succeeded an administration with which he was in complete harmony; there was as yet no loud call for rotation in office, and he was not even tempted to reconstruct the civil service.
Madison did not, however, find the apparently simple task of
filling the natural vacancies an easy one. His lack of personal
force gave hostile factions an opportunity, and they attempted
to control, through the Senate, the distribution of the patronage. A threat of opposition forced the president to relinquish his project of nominating Albert Gallatin for secretary of state; and this victory did not make his opponents more considerate. The nomination of General Dearborn as secretary of war was defeated; there was a contest over the confirmation of Monroe as secretary of state in 1811, and another in 1813 when Jonathan Russell was nominated as minister to Sweden. We have some interesting notes, taken by Pickering, on the debate which took
place when the name of Joel Barlow, for minister to France, was
sent in. Pickering sarcastically defended the nomination, saying
that Barlow was no mere poet, for he had made too much money, — an allusion probably to the Ohio Company frauds.
The War of 1812 brought unexpected patronage to the executive; but the administration escaped much of the toil involved by leaving military nominations almost wholly to the state delegations. William Lowndes wrote to his wife that he should have liked a commission, but that he felt a scruple about asking for one, as the delegation of which he was a member really made the appointment. The advice of the state delegation was not always followed, however. Gallatin complained that a Mr. Chrystie, selected by the New York members for a lieutenant-colonelcy, was nominated for a majority only, because of the hostility of the secretary of war. The nomination of Thomas Pinckney, a South Carolina Federalist, received some opposition in the Senate, and caused general surprise. Even Lowndes, an extremely liberal man, wrote to his wife regarding it, “The Republican party, having so large a proportion of the population of the State, has enough of talents and of virtue to serve the country, if the administration knew how to select and employ them.” Madison, however, adhered to the policy of the Federalists, in making the war a national and not a party measure. He recognized the opposition, not only in the military but also in the diplomatic appointments, by making James A. Bayard a member of the peace commission at Ghent. This was in no sense an erasure of party lines; it was merely a call for the
assistance of the minority, an assistance then much needed. In
the selection of individuals from both parties, political motives
played the usual prominent part. It was bi-partisan, not
non-partisan.