It was fitting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone. Obeying the stern precept of war, which enjoins the overcoming of the adversary and the extinction of his power wherever assailable as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be thought of.
Following the comprehensive scheme of general attack, powerful forces were assembled at various points on our coast to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. Meanwhile naval demonstrations were made at several exposed points. On May 11th the cruiser Wilmington and torpedo boat Winslow were unsuccessful in an attempt to silence the batteries at Cardenas, against Matanzas, Worth Bagley and four seamen falling.
These grievous fatalities were, strangely enough, among the very few which occurred during our naval operations in this extraordinary conflict.
Meanwhile the Spanish naval preparations had been pushed with great vigor. A powerful squadron under Admiral Cervera, which had assembled at the Cape Verde Islands before the outbreak of hostilities, had crossed the ocean, and by its erratic movements in the Caribbean Sea delayed our military operations while baffling the pursuit of our fleets. For a time fears were felt lest the Oregon and Marietta, then nearing home after their long voyage from San Francisco of over 15,000 miles, might be surprised by Admiral Cervera’s fleet, but their fortunate arrival dispelled these apprehensions and lent much needed re-enforcement.
Not until Admiral Cervera took refuge in the Harbor of Santiago de Cuba about May 9th was it practicable to plan a systematic military attack upon the Antillean possessions of Spain. Several demonstrations occurred on the coasts of Cuba and Porto Rico in preparation for the larger event. On May 13th the North Atlantic squadron shelled San Juan de Porto Rico. On May 30th Commodore Schley’s squadron bombarded the forts guarding the mouth of Santiago Harbor. Neither attack had any material result. It was evident that well-ordered land operations were indispensable to achieve a decisive advantage.