The continuous development of the mine and the torpedo makes it impossible to establish a close watch with heavy ships on the exits from the Heligoland Bight. To do so for a long period of time would mean a steady and serious wastage of valuable units from the above causes, and, if prolonged, would effectually alter the balance of naval power. On the other hand, torpedo craft, which cannot keep at sea like great vessels, and must every three or four days return to port for rest and replenishment, have no base nearer than Harwich, 240 miles away. The operation of controlling the debouches from the Heligoland Bight by means of flotillas would require twice the number of oversea torpedo craft that we now possess. The watch would have to be maintained in three reliefs: one on duty, one in transit, and one at rest, and therefore only a third of the existing vessels would be available at any given time. Such a force could be overwhelmed by a sudden attack of two or three times their numbers by a well-chosen blow, opportunities for which would frequently recur. Unless, therefore, we were to take by storm some fortified German island which could be held as a base, or were permitted to use Dutch or Danish territory, the closing of the debouches of the Heligoland Bight by a close flotilla cordon is, in the opinion of the Admiralty, impracticable at present.
The development of submarines of ocean-going capacity may be expected to modify this situation in our favour.
The problem of controlling the alternative debouches from the Baltic by watching over the Skaw or the Belts presents many of the features that have been found so unfavourable in regard to the Heligoland Bight. Nothing effective could be done, or still less maintained, with our present forces without using the territory of Norway or Denmark, or both. It must be borne in mind that the enemy have the option of striking with their whole force on either line.
On the assumption that a close blockade, either of the Heligoland Bight or of the exits from the Baltic, is not possible, the Admiralty cannot guarantee that individual vessels will not frequently slip through the cruiser squadrons patrolling the wide area of the North Sea. The North Sea comprises an area of more than 125,000 square miles. The number of cruisers available is less than 30, of which a large proportion will always be recoaling. The aid that can be given at a distance from the British shore by torpedo craft would be partial and fleeting. The weather is frequently thick; on a third of the days in the year the visibility is not more than 4 miles; on a quarter of the days in the year it is not more than 2 miles. There are about five days fog per month during the year. April averages ten days fog. At night it is frequently impossible to see a ship without lights at more than a few hundred yards distance, and often not at that. It is no exaggeration to say that the main risk which a single fast ship would run, steaming at night without lights, would be that of collision, which chance may be very well accepted. It will be easy to demonstrate this by experiments at the forthcoming manœuvres. If, therefore, close and certain observation becomes impossible, there is a very good chance of an indefinite succession of individual transports reaching the British coasts without being intercepted by the controlling cruiser squadrons.