The Hanoverian levies did well also, excepting one regiment, which refused to charge the French when commanded so to do. And this was doubtless owing to the _lâcheté_ of their colonel, who, when ordered to lead his regiment to the charge, declined to do so, saying he had no confidence in his men. It is related that Captain Horace Seymour, who had brought this officer Lord Uxbridge’s orders, addressed “a few words of plain Saxon” to him, “which no gentleman ought to have listened to unmoved,” but the only effect they had on the Hanoverian was to hasten his departure to the rear. The Brunswick Contingent fought at a disadvantage at Waterloo, having lost their brave leader (the Duke of Brunswick) at Quatre Bras. Of the Nassau, Dutch, and Belgian troops it is only fair to say that they were, mostly, utterly useless at Waterloo. The glamour of Napoleon was upon them. They had lately been in his service, and had a settled conviction that Wellington would be defeated and his army cut to pieces. “Come over to us, brave Belgians!” shouted a French regiment at Waterloo to their Belgian opponents in the battle. But the “brave Belgians” preferred making “a retrograde movement for strategical reasons,” and retired from the field, carrying news of Wellington’s defeat to Brussels.
Now for Napoleon’s army: This consisted on the 15th of June of about 128,000 men[A]—mostly veterans who had served in many campaigns, and to whom defeat was rare. Add to this, that they all belonged to one nation, and were all equally devoted to their beloved emperor. “No army,” says Colonel Chesney, in his _Waterloo Lecture_, “was probably ever so well furnished with leaders as his, as none had ever the like experience wherewith to train them.” It is no slight to Wellington to say that Napoleon was, for rapid and offensive warfare, by far the first general of his day. In defensive warfare Wellington was much in advance of his great rival. Taking the words out of Philip the Second’s mouth, Wellington might have with truth said, “Time and I against any other two.” Once more: Wellington himself told Earl Stanhope that he considered the presence of Napoleon with the French army at Waterloo fully equivalent to an additional force of 30,000 men! Now this was the total of the force sent under Marshal Grouchy, on the 17th June, to follow the Prussian army, which had been defeated at Ligny by Napoleon on the previous day, and which was supposed to be in full retreat on Namur and Liége, so that, in round numbers, Napoleon was himself considered equal to a whole army corps! If the British had a Picton, the French had a Ney, who was considered almost Napoleon’s equal in handling troops in the field, and who had pressed us so sorely at Quatre Bras, on the 16th of June, when only half our army had arrived at that position. Then as a leader of cavalry Lord Uxbridge was well matched by Kellermann, whose fame as a cavalry general dated from Marengo. And General Mouton (Count Lobau) was an infantry leader of whom any army might have been proud. It was he who, at the head of the Imperial Foot Guards, had wrested the victory from the Prussians on the bloody field of Lützen, in 1813, and saved the French army from a reverse. Enough has now been said to show what a splendid army the British had opposed to them on the 18th of June, 1815. “I have them at last, these English!” exclaimed Napoleon, in a transport of joy, early in the morning of that day, when he saw our army drawn up in position, with their backs to the forest of Soignies. But he underrated Wellington’s generalship, nor could he foresee how the British generals, officers, and men of all ranks would fight that memorable day, when the eyes of all Europe were upon them, because upon the issue of that contest depended the fate of empires and kingdoms, as well as the future peace of the world. And knowing, as we all do, what glory the victory at Waterloo brought to our countrymen and our country, we must be generous enough to give the brave Prussians the full share due to them for their co-operation on that day. Had it not been for them, Waterloo would have been as barren a victory as Borodino, and Napoleon would have retreated in as good order, probably, as Blucher was able to do after his defeat at Ligny. As it was, our troops bore the whole brunt of the battle without losing an inch of ground, and the arrival of the Prussians, at the close of the day, sealed the fate of Napoleon.[B]