ERROR to the Supreme Court of Connecticut; the case being thus:

The legislature of Connecticut, in 1863, enacted that the several savings banks in the State should make annual return to the comptroller of public accounts, of the total amounts of all deposits in them respectively, on the first day of July in each successive year; and that each should annually pay to the treasurer of the State, 'a sum equal to three-fourths of one per cent. on the total amount of deposits in such savings bank, on the days aforesaid. The statute declared that this tax should be in lieu of all other taxes upon savings banks or their deposit.

Society for Savings v. Coite

With this statute in existence, the 'Society for Savings'-one of the savings banks of Connecticut, and as such empowered by its charter to receive deposits of money, and improve them for the benefit of its depositors, but having no capital stock or stockholders-had on the 1st July, 1863, $500,161 of its deposits invested in securities of the United States, which, by the act of Congress authorizing their issue, were declared to be exempt from taxation by State authority, 'whether held by individuals, corporations, or associations.' Upon the amount of their deposits thus invested, the society refused to pay the sum equal to the prescribed percentage.

Society for Savings v. Coite

On a suit brought by Coite, treasurer of the State, for the purpose of recovering the tax thus withheld, the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided that the tax in question was not a tax on property, but on the corporation as such, and rendered judgment accordingly for the plaintiff.

Society for Savings v. Coite

The correctness of the judgment was the point now here on error.

Mr. Chamberlin, for the plaintiff in error:

The question is, whether the statute of Connecticut, as sought to be enforced by the State treasurer, imposed a tax upon securities of the United States? If so, it is confessedly illegal.

The language lays a tax based upon property. It is even more directly upon the 'property,' than the statute of New York which received construction in the Bank Tax Case. That provided for a tax upon a valuation equal to the amount of capital stock,' &c.; this for a tax on the total amount of deposits, &c. The first is on a valuation equal to the amount; the second on the amount, &c. That case goes far to conclude this. In that case the court says, that in making up a tax under the law, 'the commissioners need only look into the condition of the bank in order to ascertain the amount of the capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in, and this sum in the aggregate will constitute the basis,' &c. The New York legislature probably meant to impose a tax which should be construed as a tax upon franchise and privilege irrespective of property; but the court inquire, what is the basis of the tax? In New York the basis is found to be the amount of 'capital paid in or secured,' &c.; in Connecticut it is equally clear that 'the amount of deposits' is the basis. Deposits for all the purposes of this case sustain the same relation to this institution which capital sustains to a bank. Each represents money received by the corporation to be managed for the benefit of the owners; each is properly classe among the liabilities of the corporation; each constitutes the principal fund from which investments are made, and the difference consists in the fact that 'capital' remains with the corporation, while deposits in this institution may be withdrawn.

Where is the difference between a tax upon property, and a tax upon a person measured by the amount of his property? In either case the property is the foundation and moving cause of the tax. If a person has no property he has no tax. If he has small or large possessions his tax is small or large in proportion. Suppose a person should invest the sum of $1000 in United States securities, and the legislature of the State should say to him in the form of a law, 'Inasmuch as we cannot tax you for the money lent to the general government, you as an individual shall pay a sum equal to the tax on $1000, vested in taxable securities.' Would such a law be valid? Certainly not. But why not? The law does not tax the sum lent; it imposes the tax upon the individual. But the intent is too obvious. It is in form a tax upon the individual, but in substance a tax upon the sum lent. And so in the case under consideration. It is the duty of courts to look through the shadow to the reality.