The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail:
“Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely punished.
“Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who are horseless, but fit for duty.
“It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat.
“The above instructions only touch on a few details of field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance of their duties.”
My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said:
“I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks. Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the supports and reserves. The formations have generally been ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an excellent target. If this close-order formation had been assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then, despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss. We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect. On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as possible.