But if you are not such an arrant hardened sinner but that your conscience warns you of your guilt, then come to the doctrine of probability, the A B C of the Jesuitical code of morality, which will set your troublesome conscience at rest. Listen!
“The true opinion is, that it is not only lawful to follow the _more probable_ but _less safe_ opinion ... but also that the _less safe_ may be followed when there is an equality of probability.”
“I agree in the opinion of Henriquez, Vasquez, and Perez, who maintain that it is sufficient for an inexperienced and unlearned man to follow the opinion which he _thinks to be probable because it is maintained by good men who are versed in the art; although that opinion may be neither the more safe, nor the more common, nor the more probable_.
“Sotus thinks that it would be very troublesome to a penitent, if the priest, after having heard his confession, should send him back without absolution, to confess himself again to another priest, if he could absolve him with a safe conscience _against his own (the priest’s) opinion; especially when another priest might not perhaps be readily found who would believe the opinion of the penitent to be probable_.
“It may be asked whether a confessor may give advice to a penitent _in opposition to his own opinion_; or, if he should think in any case that restitution ought to be made, whether he may advise that the opinion of others may be followed, who maintain that it need not be made? _I answer, that he lawfully may_, ... because he may follow the opinion of another in his own practice, and therefore he may advise another person to follow it. Still it is better, in giving advice, always to follow the more probable opinion to which a man is ever accustomed to adhere, _especially when the advice is given in writing, lest contradiction be discovered_. It is also sometimes expedient to send the consulting person to another doctor or confessor who is known to hold an opinion favourable to the inquirer, provided it be probable.”[233]
“Without respect of persons may a judge, in order to favour his friend, decide according to any probable opinion, while the question of right remains undecided?
“If the judge should think each opinion equally probable, for the sake of his friend he may _lawfully_ pronounce sentence according to the opinion which is more favourable to the interests of that friend. He may, moreover, with the intent to serve his friend, _at one time judge according to one opinion, and at another time according to the contrary opinion, provided only that no scandal result from the decision_.”[234]