To which there are two alternative solutions 228
And modern science is so confused that it will accept neither 228
As Dr. Tyndall's treatment of the subject very forcibly shows us 230
And Dr. Tyndall in this way is a perfect representative of the whole modern positive school 231
Let us compare the molecules of the brain to the six moving billiard-balls 231
The question is, are these movements due to the stroke of one cue or of two 233
The positive school profess to answer this question both ways 234
What they really mean is, 1st. That the connection of consciousness with matter is a mystery; as to _that_ they _can_ give no answer. 2nd. That as to whether consciousness is wholly a material thing or no, they _will_ give no answer 237
But why are they in this state of suspense? 238
Though their system does not in the least require the hypothesis of an immaterial element in consciousness 239
They see that the moral value of life does 239
The same reasons that will warrant their saying it _may_ exist, will constrain them to say it _must_ 240
Physical science, with its proofs, can say nothing in the matter, either as to will, immortality, or God 242
But, on the other hand, it will force us, if we believe in will, to admit the reality of miracles 243
So far as science goes, morality and religion are both on the same footing 243
Supposing science not to be inconsistent with theism, may not theism be inconsistent with morality? 247
It seems to be so; but it is no more so than is morality with itself. Two difficulties common to both:--1st. The existence of evil; 2nd. Man's free will and God's free will 248
James Mill's statement of the case represents the popular anti-religious arguments 249
But his way of putting the case is full of distortion and exaggeration 250
Though certain of the difficulties he pointed out were real 251
And those we cannot explain away; but if we are to believe in our moral being at all, we must one and all accept 252
We can escape from them by none of the rationalistic substitutes for religion 252
A similar difficulty is the freedom of the will 257
This belief is an intellectual impossibility 258
But at the same time a moral necessity 260
It is typical of all the difficulties attendant on an assent to our own moral nature 260