The Interstate Commerce Commission, acting under § 19a of the Interstate Commerce Act, ordered the appellant to furnish certain inventories, schedules, maps and charts of its pipe line property. Champlin's objections that the Act does not authorize the order, or if it be construed to do so is unconstitutional, were overruled by the Commission and again by the District Court which dismissed the company's suit for an injunction. These questions of law are brought here by appeal. Judicial Code, § 238, 28 U.S.C. § 345, 28 U.S.C.A. § 345.
Champlin owns and operates a line of six-inch pipe 516 miles in length lying in five states. Originating at Champlin's Enid, Oklahoma refinery, it crosses Kansas, Nebraska, a part of South Dakota, and ends in Iowa. It is used only to convey the company's own refinery products to its own terminal stations at Hutchinson, Kansas; Superior, Nebraska, and Rock Rapids, Iowa, at each of which the line connects with storage facilities from which deliveries are made.
The statute, so far as relevant, says that it shall apply 'to common carriers engaged in,' 'transportation of oil or other commodity' by pipe line from one state to another. It provides also, that 'common carrier' includes 'all pipe-line companies.' This language on its face would seem to cover the appellant's operation.
Champlin contends, however, that the 'transportation' mentioned in the Act does not refer to the carriage of one's own goods. The District Court has found that Champlin is the sole owner of the products transported through its pipe line; it has never transported, offered to transport, or been asked to transport any products belonging to any other company or person; its pipe line does not connect with any other pipe line but only with storage tanks at the three terminal points; there are no facilities for putting any petroleum product into the line other than at the Enid refinery; delivery of the products at the three terminal points is made from Champlin's storage tanks by means of truck racks or railroad tank car racks and is not made directly from the pipe line in any instance; no tariffs stating transportation charges have been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission or with any State commission or regulatory body.
Because of these facts the appellant suggests that the language and holding of this Court concerning the Uncle Sam Oil Company in The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 34 S.Ct. 956, 58 L.Ed. 1459, approved in Valvoline Oil Company v. United States, 308 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 160, 84 L.Ed. 151, govern this case. The Uncle Sam Company operation is described as 'simply drawing oil from its own wells across a state line to its own refinery, for its own use, and that is all, * * *.' The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 562, 34 S.Ct. 956, 959, 58 L.Ed. 1459. The Court considered this was not 'transportation' within the meaning of the Act.
But we think it would expand the actual holding of that case to apply its conclusion to Champlin. The controlling fact under the statute is transporting commodities from state to state by pipe line. Admittedly Champlin is not a common carrier in the sense of the common law carrier for hire. However, the Act does not stop at this but goes on to say that its use of the term 'common carrier' is to include all pipe line companies-a meaningless addition if it thereby included only what the term without more always had included. While Champlin technically is transporting its own oil, manufacturing processes have been completed; the oil is not being moved for Champlin's own use. These interstate facilities are operated to put its finished products in the market in interstate commerce at the greatest economic advantage.
Examination of Champlin's pricing methods supports the view that appellant is engaged in transportation even though the products are still its own when moved. The District Court found that price at the terminal points includes f.o.b. price at the Enid refinery and an additional sum called a differential. The differential is the through railroad freight rate from Enid to the final destination (usually the purchaser's place of business) less the carrying charges from the pipe line terminal to final destination. The District Court found, however, that competitive and other conditions 'sometimes cause departures from the prices arrived at in accordance with the formula above described.' Appellant states that as to some deliveries 'rail rates were used merely as a basis for calculating a delivered price, not as a charge for transportation.' Even so, and even though departures from the calculated differential are substantial and frequent, we think this practice points up a significant distinction from the Uncle Sam case.