Though the officers lacked a proper military spirit, they were generally good in other ways, particularly those of the regular army. The best proof of their gallantry is furnished by the number of losses sustained by the 1st Army from November, 1904, to September, 1905, from which it will be seen that their proportion of killed and wounded was considerably higher than that of the men.
+-------+-------------------+-------------------+ | | Officers. | Rank and File. | +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+ | | |Percentage| |Percentage| | |Numbers.|to Average|Numbers.|to Average| | | | Strength.| | Strength.| +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+ |Killed | 167 | 4·1 | 4,779 | 2·5 | |Wounded| 905 | 23·8 | 27,425 | 14·6 | |Missing| 89 | 2·1 | 5,684 | 2·9 | | +--------+----------+--------+----------+ | | 1,151 | 30 | 37,888 | 20 | +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
The losses in this army for the whole period of the war were somewhat higher:
Officers. Rank and File. Killed 396 10,435 Wounded 1,773 56,350
With the exception of those who had volunteered for the front, the officers of the reserve were not nearly so well qualified as those of the regulars; they were much behind them in tactical training, and did not always perform their duties with the zeal which should be shown on active service. Many ensigns of the reserve turned out unsatisfactory, having accepted this rank purely to escape becoming private soldiers upon mobilization; they had no sympathy with the military profession, and hated soldiering. They were absolutely without training, and some of them had no authority whatever over the men. The ensigns and acting ensigns[23] promoted from the ranks for distinguished service were excellent in every respect. Having been selected from the rank and file, they usually appreciated their rank, and had considerable authority amongst the men; they got on well with the officers, and proved efficient and hard-working assistants to the company commanders. The extent to which the acting ensigns sacrificed themselves to duty is evinced by the fact that of 680 in the 1st Army in February, 192 were killed and wounded in the Mukden battle—_i.e._, more than 28 per cent. The moral tone of the officers was quite satisfactory; during the whole period of the war only nineteen were dismissed for unbecoming conduct. In reporting on the work done by the officers of the General Staff, the majority of the senior officers in command of troops expressed the opinion that their theoretical training and intelligence stood very high, and that their work was unselfish, but that they were not sufficiently in touch with the troops, and lacked the personal, practical knowledge required to enable them to judge properly how much might be expected of men, and in what way an order would be carried out—a knowledge which is necessary if small errors are to be avoided in the transmission of orders, etc. They recommended that, to give these staff-officers the necessary practical training, they should do most of their service with troops of all three Arms, and only a part of their service on the staff; while, to prevent them being looked upon by the troops as mere clerks, they should be relieved of the mass of clerical work that now falls to the General Staff. As in other bodies of men, so amongst these officers are to be found some specially fitted for field-work, and others, again, who prefer purely staff duties, and in my opinion the two classes should be separated. Generally speaking, the General Staff officers in the 1st Army did everything that was required of them. From November, 1904, to September, 1905, their losses in killed and wounded amounted to 12 per cent. of their strength; if the casualties which occurred before the formation of the 1st Army are taken into account, the percentage works out as much as 25·7. During the whole of the above time only four were sent back to Russia on account of sickness, while the majority of the wounded returned to the front.