He now had at Tabor and at Nebraska City, five wagon loads of stuff[254] which was wholly useless for any purpose relating to Kansas. He had been posing, for nearly a year, as a hero charged with the responsibility of saving Kansas to freedom, and had finally come to the end of his rope. To Mr. Sanborn he wrote, August 13th:[255]
I am now, at last, within a kind of hailing distance of our Free-State friends in Kansas.... I am now waiting to know what is best to do next.
Four days later he wrote to his wife these significant words:
Should no disturbance occur, we may possibly think best to work back eastward.[256]
I have been trying all season to get to Kansas; but have failed as yet, through ill health, want of means to pay Freights, travelling expenses, etc. _How to act now_; I do not know.[257]
There was nothing more that Brown could do. The failure of his pretensions was almost complete. Only his vocabulary had survived the general wreck. It was still intact and in working order. Drawing upon that inexhaustible resource of the charlatan, he wrote to Mr. Sanborn, October 1st:
I am now so far recovered from my hurt, as to be able to do a little; and foggy as it is, "we do not give up the ship." I will not say that Kansas, watered by the tears and blood of my children, shall yet be free or I fall.[258]
A comparison of Brown's correspondence at this time, with what his eulogists have put forth concerning it, discloses a wide divergence between the facts therein stated, and the biographical fiction relating thereto. Referring to Brown's irrelevant reference to the tears and blood of his children, Mr. Villard says:
Brave as this sentiment is, it only increases the mystery of Brown's delaying at Tabor.... Obviously, Brown, grim, self-willed, resolute chieftain that he generally was, appeared baffled here and lacking wholly in a determination to reach the scene of action at any cost.... It will be seen that, when he finally reached Kansas, he stayed but a few days, was practically in hiding,...[259]
Only editorial fiction mystifies the cause of his delay at Tabor. The "grim, self-willed, resolute chieftain" had a clear and unalterable purpose in view, when he was delaying there. It was to attempt the conquest of the Southern States. If he entered Kansas, it would be merely an incident in the promotion of that scheme. His attitude was pivotal but not enigmatic; if a "disturbance" occurred in Kansas, he intended to proceed thither, and under cover of it, execute such purposes as he had in view; otherwise, he would "work back eastward."