Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK join, dissenting.
The Court of Appeals characterized petitioners' suit as follows: 'The gravamen of their complaint is that the subpoenas were invalidly, maliciously and mischievously issued and served for the sole purpose of exposing them to public scorn with consequent loss of employment and of esteem. They assert that they have a federal right to protection against such abuse of federal process; that since the subpoenas were not properly issued appellee in securing their issuance and service has subjected himself to personal liability.' 9 Cir., 302 F.2d 36-37. The Court of Appeals did not, however, decide whether such a 'federal right' exists and, if so, whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a denial of it. It sustained the District Court's dismissal on the sole ground that the allegedly unlawful acts had been committed by respondent in the line of his duty as a federal officer, and that therefore he was immune from suit by reason of the principles announced in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434. In this Court, the Solicitor General of the United States, appearing as counsel for the respondent, candidly admits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Barr v. Matteo. In that case we upheld the governmental-officer immunity in respect of 'action * * * taken * * * within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty.' 360 U.S., at 575, 79 S.Ct. at 1341. It has never been suggested that the immunity reaches beyond that perimeter, so as to shield a federal officer acting wholly on his own. A federal officer remains liable for acts committed 'manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.' Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498, 16 S.Ct. 631, 637, 40 L.Ed. 780; see Colpoys v. Gates, 73 App.D.C. 193, 118 F.2d 16; Kozlowski v. Ferrara, D.C., 117 F.Supp. 650; Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 827, 835 (1957). Liberally construed, see Virgin Islands Corp. v. W. A. Taylor & Co., 2 Cir., 202 F.2d 61; 2 Moore, Federal practice (2d ed. 1948), 12.08, at 2245, petitioner Dawson's complaint alleges no less. He alleges that respondent 'secured from the staff of said Committee, blank subpoenas in large numbers' (emphasis supplied), and this can be read, the Solicitor General concedes, 'to allege that no member of the Committee even attempted to delegate the Committee's subpoena power to Wheeler.' Since members of the Committee's staff clearly have no power to delegate the issuance of subpoenas, respondent, according to the allegations of the complaint, was acting 'manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.'
I think the proper disposition of this case would be to vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment, based as it was wholly upon an erroneous ground, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the questions which that court found unnecessary to decide. I recommend this course because the instant case seems to be to raise novel and important questions which have not been adequately briefed or argued by the parties and which this Court consequently, in its opinion today, treats in a most cursory fashion.
The Court states that 'Dawson's main reliance is on the Fourth Amendment.' I cannot agree with this. As the Court of Appeals correctly apprehended, the gravamen of the complaint is the notion of a tort of malicious abuse of federal process by a federal officer. This to me raises a number of questions. Does the complaint state a claim actionable under common-law principles? If so, and if the claim is a creature of state law, may it nevertheless be entertained in the federal courts? Under what theory, if any, can the claim be deemed federal and within the original jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts? As will become apparent, these questions, which I shall discuss in order, do not require reference to the Fourth Amendment.