“_The great object of the war is_--Down, down with the French.”
King Ferdinand was again on board the _Foudroyant_, holding his Levées on the quarter-deck, and making himself as affable as was possible to a man of his morose temperament. Nelson’s infatuation for the welfare of his Majesty and his kingdom seemed growing. The castle of St Elmo had fallen, thereby completing the conquest of Naples, but the Admiral saw fit to order Troubridge to march against Capua, thereby denuding the fleet of a thousand men, who were to act in concert with four times that number of troops. This was done after the receipt of a warning from Keith that it might be necessary to withdraw the squadron for the protection of Minorca.
“Should such an order come at this moment,” Nelson writes to Earl Spencer, “it would be a cause for some consideration whether Minorca is to be risked, or the two Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily? I rather think my decision would be to risk the former.” In other words, Nelson placed the interests of an allied Power before those of his own country, although of course his services to the Sicilies were of importance to the latter. One cannot help thinking that there is more than a suspicion of ulterior motives in what was to lead to a flagrant disobedience of orders. The letter concludes with the most affectionate references to Sir William and Lady Hamilton, who were assuredly his evil genii at the moment. According to Nelson they were with him to his “great comfort,” without them “it would have been impossible I could have rendered half the service to his Majesty which I have now done: their heads and their hearts are equally great and good.” Writing to Keith on the same day--13th July 1799--he refers solely to King Ferdinand: “It has been and is my study to treat his Majesty with all the respect due to so great a personage, and I have the pleasure to believe that my humble endeavours have met with the Royal approbation.”
After penning this communication the Admiral received a despatch from Keith, dated the 27th June, implicitly requiring him “to send such Ships as you can possibly spare off the Island of Minorca to wait my orders.” This he acknowledged by saying that “as soon as the safety of His Sicilian Majesty’s Kingdoms is secured, I shall not lose one moment in making the detachment you are pleased to order. At present, under God’s Providence, the safety of His Sicilian Majesty, and his speedy restoration to his Kingdom, depends on this Fleet, and the confidence inspired even by the appearance of our Ships before the City is beyond all belief; and I have no scruple in declaring my opinion that should any event draw us from the Kingdom, that if the French remain in any part of it, disturbances will again arise, for all order having been completely overturned, it must take a thorough cleansing, and some little time, to restore tranquillity.” In order to justify his conduct, Nelson next sent a second note to Earl Spencer. After referring to his previous letter, which showed that he was prepared for Keith’s order, he adds, “more than ever is my mind made up, that, at this moment, I will not part with a single Ship, as I cannot do that without drawing a hundred and twenty men from each Ship now at the Siege of Capua, where an Army is gone this day. I am fully aware of the act I have committed; but, sensible of my loyal intentions, I am prepared for any fate which may await my disobedience. Capua and Gaeta will soon fall; and the moment the scoundrels of French are out of this Kingdom, I shall send eight or nine Ships of the Line to Minorca. I have done what I thought right; others may think differently; but it will be my consolation that I have gained a Kingdom, seated a faithful Ally of his Majesty firmly on his throne, and restored happiness to millions. Do not think, my dear Lord, that my opinion is formed from the arrangements of any one. _No_; be it good, or be it bad, it is all my own.” The writer concludes with an appeal for Earl Spencer’s interest with the Board of the Admiralty, which was not vouchsafed. His having proceeded to the Bay of Naples and of the operations against the castle of St Elmo were approved, but not of the land warfare carried on by the seamen against Capua. Their Lordships did not see “sufficient reason to justify your having disobeyed the orders you had received from your Commanding-Officer, or having left Minorca exposed to the risk of being attacked, without having any Naval force to protect it.”