Mr. Krock's account (in the _New York Times_, June 18, 1961 and July 2, 1961) is rather involved; but here is the essence of it:
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to enclose Berlin 110 miles within the Soviet occupation zone. Winant submitted a recommendation, embracing this agreement. Winant felt that it would offend the Soviets if we asked for guaranteed access routes, and believed that guarantees were unnecessary anyway. When submitting his recommendation to Washington, however, Winant attached a map on which a specific allied corridor of access into the city was drawn.
Winant's proposal was never acted on in Washington. Therefore, the British submitted a recommendation. Roosevelt rejected the British plan, and made his own proposal. The British and Soviets disliked Roosevelt's plan; and negotiations over the zoning of Berlin were deadlocked.
George F. Kennan broke the deadlock by going directly to Roosevelt and persuading him to accept the Berlin zoning agreement, which Mr. Krock calls a "war-breeding monstrosity," and a "witless travesty on statecraft and military competence."
Mr. Krock says most of his information came from one of Philip E. Mosely's articles in an old issue of _Foreign Affairs_--which I have been unable to get for my files. I cannot, therefore, guarantee the authenticity of Mr. Krock's account; but I can certainly agree with his conclusion that only Joseph Stalin and international communism benefitted from the "incredible zoning agreements" that placed "Berlin 110 miles within the Soviet zone and reserved no guaranteed access routes to the city from the British and American zones."
It is interesting to note that Philip E. Mosely (CFR member who was Cordell Hull's adviser when the postwar division of Germany was first discussed at the Moscow Conference in 1943) succeeded George F. Kennan as political adviser to John G. Winant of the European Advisory Commission shortly after Kennan had persuaded Roosevelt to accept the Berlin zoning agreements.
It is easy to see why the Soviets wanted the Berlin arrangement which Roosevelt gave them. It is not difficult to see the British viewpoint: squeezed between the two giants who were his allies, Churchill tried to play the Soviets against the Americans, in the interest of getting the most he could for the future trade and commerce of England.