We are concerned now with the _Moral and Political Philosophy_. It has been already stated that it is based upon the principles of utilitarianism. As for personal moral conduct, he justly considered it to be vastly influenced by early custom; or, as he expresses it, the art of life consists in the right “setting of our habits.”
On the subjoined examination of the question of the lawfulness or otherwise of flesh-eating, his ultimate refuge in an alleged biblical authority (forced upon him, apparently, by the necessity of his position rather than by personal inclination) confirms rather than weakens his preceding candid _admissions_, which sufficiently establish our position:--
“A right to the flesh of animals. This is a _very different claim_ from the former [‘a right to the fruits or vegetable produce of the earth’]. _Some_ excuse seems necessary for the pain and loss which we occasion to [other] animals by restraining them of their liberty, mutilating their bodies, and, at last, putting an end to their lives for our pleasure or convenience.
“The reasons alleged in vindication of this practice are the following--that the several species of animals being created to prey upon one another[187] affords a kind of analogy to prove that the human species were intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would overrun the earth, and exclude mankind from the occupation of it;[188] that they are requited for what they suffer at our hands by our care and protection.
“Upon which reasons I would observe that the analogy contended for _is extremely lame_, since [the carnivorous] animals have no power to support life by any other means, and _since we have, for the whole human species might subsist entirely upon fruit, pulse, herbs, and roots, as many tribes of Hindus[189] actually do_. The two other reasons may be valid reasons, as far as they go, for, no doubt, if men had been supported entirely by vegetable food a great part of those animals who die to furnish our tables would never have lived[190] but they by no means justify our right over the lives of other animals to the extent to which we exercise it. What danger is there, _e.g._, of fish interfering with us in the occupation of their element, or what do we contribute to their support or preservation?