‘My second authority is as follows: ‘Salisberiensie, sacræ theologiæ eximii doctoris in libro suo Policratici, li. ii. cap. 15. Sic dicit; amico adulari non licet; sed aurem tiranni mulcere licitum est, ei namque scilicet tiranno licet adulari quem licet occidere;’ that is to say, It is unlawful to flatter a friend, but not so to deceive by fair words the ears of a tyrant; for since it is lawful to put him to death, it is allowable to cheat him by flattering speeches.
‘My third authority is from several doctors, whom I class together, not to exceed the number of three, namely, ‘Ricardi de media villa, Alexandri de Hallis et Astensis, in summa qui conclusionem præfatam ponunt in iii. efforum;’ adding, for higher authority, the confirmation of St Peter the apostle, who says, ‘Subditi estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, audem vero bonorum, quia sic est voluntas Dei.’ Scribitur primæ Pet. ii. That is to say, It is the will of God that all should obey the king, as sovereign lord over his kingdom; and the duke, as being sent by the king to punish those who have done ill, and remunerate the good.
‘Hence it follows, that dukes are obliged, to the utmost of their power, to avenge the injuries that are done, or may be intended against the king’s person, and to oppose all such attempts as may come to their knowledge.
‘I now proceed to the authorities from moral philosophers, the first of which is,—‘Ante forum principis pluribus locis cuilibet subditorum licitum est occidere tyrannum, et non solum licitum immo laudabile.’ That is to say, It is lawful for any subject to destroy a tyrant, and not only lawful, but even honourable and worthy of praise.
‘Cicero, in libro de Officiis, ‘Laudatis illos qui illum Cæsarem interfecerunt quamvis esset sibi familiarium amicus eo quod jura imperii quasi tyrannus usurpaverat.’ That is, Tully writes, in his noble book on morality, That those who killed Julius Cæsar are praiseworthy, because Julius had usurped the government of Rome as a tyrant.
‘My third authority is from Boccacio, who, in his book ‘de Casibus virorum illustrium, s. lib. ii. cap. 15. contra filios tyrannorum,’ in speaking of the tyrant, says, ‘Shall I call him king? shall I call him prince? shall I preserve my allegiance to him? Oh no: he is an enemy to the public welfare. May I employ conspiracies and open force against him? It is very proper and necessary so to do,—for there is not a more agreeable sacrifice than the blood of a tyrant, and it is insupportable to receive blame for having done good.’