* Even by a miracle if necessary. It is recorded that when Jesus was called upon to pay taxes in Capernaum (Matt, xvii) he made no argument for exemption, but straightway dispatched his disciple Peter after the didrachma, with which, it is assumed, the debt to the community was discharged.
A weak attempt to justify church graft consists in the affirmation that it is engaged in purely altruistic labors, and is not a profitmaking institution. It is not engaged in any openly commercial undertaking. Salvation is free, and all are welcome to its inestimable blessings. The sophistry and lack of ingenuousness which make it possible to present such an argument with a straight face can scarcely be characterized in parliamentary language. It fairly reeks with self-evident fallacies. First of all, if the church chooses to run its affairs on a non-profit basis, that is strictly its own business, and does not concern the state in any way. If it has no property, it escapes taxation as a matter of course, like the individual who has nothing. But if it is able to own property, it immediately incurs a specific obligation to the state, which is totally independent of the use it makes of its property. The man who retires from business, and lives on his income, is not thenceforward exempted from all taxation, because he is no longer making money. Nor does it serve as an excuse that he is making no profitable investments, but is using up his bare capital, and is spending his time and part of his means in philanthropic work. In spite of all this, he is a member of society, and must meet his obligations as such, whenever the tax collector comes around. The same is true of an organization. The church takes up just as much space, receives as much social protection and as much benefit from every civic improvement, whether it is making money or not. The state does not forbid it to make money or to engage in commercial enterprises; and its failure to do so is purely voluntary, and is entirely irrelevant to the discharge of its pecuniary obligation to organized society. Its privileges may be free; but what does that mean to those who count them as worthless? It is a cheap evasion of responsibility to offer in lieu of the specific payment of a debt, to render the creditor some form of alleged service for which he has no possible use, and which means nothing whatever to him. This remains true, even if the unbeliever is under the spell of error, and ought to appreciate the blessings of religious counsel. The dance may be one of the most beautiful forms of art; but if Vernon Castle offered to discharge a monetary obligation to a blind creditor by the execution of the most wonderful Terpsichorean evolutions in his presence, there would be no payment of the debt, even though the artistic performance might be intrinsically worth far more than the sum owed, and would be readily so appraised by all who had their eyes. No matter how valuable religious exercises may be in themselves, nor how much satisfaction they may give those who believe in them, the civil rights of the unbeliever remain on a par with those of the believer; and it remains true that the offer by the church of un-desired services can in no way constitute an obligation. Let the church be supported by those who accept its offer, and who desire to profit by its privileges, such as they are. This remains no affair of other persons, or of the state. The benefits of religion are subjective and strictly personal; and the state is in no way qualified to pass on their value. To say that non-churchmen should help pay the expenses of the church because they can become churchmen if they wish to do so, is to say that a debt can be contracted without a consideration.