St. Augustine, Fla., November 20th, 1655.
Having begun the conversion of the Indians in the Province of Apalache at the close of the administration of Governor Louis Harristenir, who was immediately succeeded by Dannian de las Vegas. He placed a few soldiers in this Province to guard the going out and incoming of vessels. Having been informed that they entered and left the Port, and there was no one to give any report of them. This guard was kept there during the assumption of power by Benito Ruiz Salazar and the Auditor Nicolas Ponce de Leon, until the Sergeant-Major Don Pedro Harristenir entered as Governor. This latter, to please the Friar, he not only dismantled the estates of your Majesty in those parts, but he also retired the Lieutenant and soldiers who assisted him, having no one to administer justice to the Natives, nor to give information concerning the Post, and so, immediately upon my taking the place of Governor, having been informed by the General Governors and other notables who were convened in Havana, and notified further by all the principal people of this Garrison who demonstrated how necessary it was to have a Lieutenant in said Province to guard and advise, as there had entered a vessel of the enemy, and the natives had aided them and supplied them in exchange for furs, hatchets, knives and other goods, without its being known in this Garrison. For this reason I named to the position Captain Antonio Sartucha and two soldiers with the instructions which I send enclosed--so that justice might be administered to the Natives, it being too laborious and the distance too great for them to come to this Garrison to adjust their quarrels and differences and to guard the Port and advise me. In a few days after his arrival he notified me of another vessel of the enemy (pirates) who had entered the Port. He asked for aid for infantrymen, which I sent him, to the number of forty, in command of Captain Gregorio Bravo. Before this aid reached him, the enemy was able to procure what they wanted. By pushing into service the natives, he was however able to prevent them from landing. It being urgent that I should go in person to pacify and punish the natives of the Province of Timagua, testimony of which decrees were made. I remit them to your Majesty. I passed on to visit the other Provinces and investigate the condition of the harbors. I did this with the consent of all the Casiques, and the approved judgment of Fray Francisco de San Antonio and other Friars, with the advice also of the Treasurer of the Royal Hacienda, and many of the reformed natives. I left in command the Sergeant-Major Don Adrian de Canizares, being a person of experience and trustworthy, giving him twelve infantrymen with which to defend the Port and coast of these Ports, and that he should administer justice to the Natives for which purpose I elected a syndicate of Friars who work in said Province, and some of their friends. Having determined upon this at the time you ordered me to be vigilant and careful, since the English enemy had attempted to occupy one of the Ports of this Province, according to information given your Majesty by Don Diego Cardenas, ambassador to England, and had been sent to me by Field Marshal Don Juan Montiano, Governor who was of Havana--information he gained from some prisoners, which confirms the information you had. There has been a fleet of the enemy on these coasts of Florida and the Bahama Channel. Although I had intended to increase the force of soldiers, build a Fort and found a settlement of Spaniards as I reported was agreed upon in the visit, which testimony, and that of the taxes and good government I remit with the decrees. I have desisted from this on account of the many contradictions and opposition of some of the Friars, who with the pretext that the vicinity of the Spaniards would be dangerous to the conversion, and who do not consider that this danger has a remedy, and it would be much more dangerous that the enemy should occupy that Port and plant foot on your territory and fortify themselves in a province so rich and abundant as those of Apalachicola, the knowledge of which the enemy is sure to be fully aware, and the danger would be irreparable and would lose in totem the conversions of these Provinces, and this Garrison would be unable to dislodge the enemy, from the distance at which we are, and that we could not scatter our forces, being too few of them, besides the consequences and damage which would accrue from pirates on the coast of Havana and the Bahama Channel--and there is no way of reaching us under five or six days of sailing.