Ratification, as we have seen, frequently caused considerable delay, until the device was invented of ratifying at the time of deposition. When the evidence was thus in proper shape, the next move was its so-called publication. This might or might not be the final step of the prosecution, for it never was precluded from bringing in new evidence, and there might be half a dozen or more successive publications, especially when a group of Judaizers were on trial and they broke down one by one and told what they knew about their associates. The effectiveness of this is illustrated by the case of Engracia Rodríguez at Valladolid, in 1643. After her case had apparently reached its end, the consulta de fe voted her to torture, which was duly administered, without eliciting a confession. Then from time to time came new publications of evidence, until her resolution gave way and, at the seventh publication, eleven months after her torture, she confessed to Judaism. She probably recognized that her kindred and friends were yielding, one after another and incriminating her, and that it was useless to resist longer, with the certainty--of which her advocate doubtless informed her--that persistence would indubitably end in her burning alive as an impenitent _negativa_.[146]
As this publication of evidence was the only inkling afforded to the accused of what was the case against him, and as it was assumed to give him ample opportunity of defence, it is worth a little special consideration. We have seen that the pretext of protecting witnesses was held as justifying the suppression of their names and of all circumstances that might lead to their identification. Even under the most rigid construction, this crippled greatly the defence, but rigid construction of their powers was not common among the tribunals. When once it was admitted that portions of the evidence could lawfully be suppressed, the selection of what should be made known became largely discretional.
The endeavor to lay down rules for guidance as to this led to an infinity of instructions, more or less rigid or lax. In 1498, the Suprema called attention to the evils that had hitherto followed publication, wherefore in future care must be taken to omit all circumstances giving a clue to the identity of the witnesses, and this was repeated in 1499.[147] Yet the glaring injustice of withholding from the accused a knowledge of details that might enable him to disprove the charges was recognized, but all instructions forbidding this were framed with an "if" that virtually authorized the wrong. For instance, the specification of time and place at which an act was said to have been performed was indispensable, if the accused were to have a chance of detecting false swearing, yet such details might possibly lead him to identify the witness, and these opposing reasons gave rise to a series of varying orders which indicate how the Suprema vacillated between the desire to secure the advantage and the consciousness of the wrong. In 1525 it condemned the practice of the Toledo tribunal in omitting time and place. It was difficult to make the inquisitors observe this and, in 1527, a general order was issued to state the evidence as the witnesses had given it, neither more nor less. In 1530 it made a concession by ordering that it should be consulted when there was "inconvenience" in stating the month or year. Then, in 1532, it laid down the positive rule that place and time and persons must be stated, for the principle that the witness must be protected was to be construed as preventing only direct recognition and not inferential. This was again modified, in 1537, when, while again ordering that all the evidence must be given, this was qualified by the old injunction to suppress all circumstances by which the witnesses could be identified. About 1560, some instructions to Barcelona order that the time should be stated, while place is to be indicated in such general terms as shall not betray the witness. Finally, in the definitive Instructions of 1561, time and place are ordered to be given, but at the same the omission is prescribed of all that may betray the witness. A caution that no evidence is to be used that is not in the publication gives a hint of other irregularities of even a more serious nature.[148]