The öniggräPrussian plan of operations required an advance of Frederick Charles’ armies from Saxony into Bohemia, and an invasion of that province by the Second Army, advancing from Silesia; both armies to unite at Gitschin, or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus advancing from divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary the advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a serious military error, as the general operating by interior lines, holding one of the opponent’s armies by a containing force, and falling with superior numbers upon the other, may defeat both in succession. Von Moltke’s plan was, however, sound and proper, for the following reasons:
1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian frontier compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, in order that Lusatia and Silesia might both be protected from Austrian invasion; and the only possible concentration that would not yield to the enemy the advantage of the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a concentration to the front, in the hostile territory.
2. The entire army “could not have advanced in effective order by one set of mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so lengthened that it would have been impossible to form to a front commensurate with its numbers.”
3. The re-entering base of the Prussians would enable each of their armies to cover its communications with its base, while one of these armies would surely menace the communications of the Austrians, if Von Benedek should advance against either.
4. The certainty that the Prussian armies could act with celerity, and the probability that the Austrian army was not yet fully prepared for prompt offensive maneuvers, justified the hope that the concentration might be effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy’s line. The distance from Görlitz and Neisse to Gitschin was less than the distance from Olmütz, Brünn and Bömisch Trübau to the same point, and there was an excellent prospect of being able to concentrate before Von Benedek could get his army well in hand to strike the Prussian armies separately.
5. By keeping up telegraphic communication between the two separated armies, their co-operation and simultaneous action could be assured.