La Touche Tréville was now in command at Toulon. Nelson disliked the man as sincerely as he loathed the nation whom he represented; he could “never trust a Corsican or a Frenchman.” La Touche Tréville had been commodore, it will be remembered, of the Boulogne flotilla when Nelson had made his abortive attacks on it. These were lauded all over France as “glorious contests.” Nelson was what is usually called, by a strange misnomer, “a good hater.” Thus to duty was added a personal rivalry that filled him with an ardent longing to “get even” with his antagonist.
Napoleon had now a sufficient number of small boats at Boulogne and neighbouring ports for the conveyance of his 130,000 troops to England. He had abandoned his original plan and was determined that the Navy proper should play an important part in the perilous project. The Toulon fleet, after releasing the French _l’Aigle_ at Cadiz, was to be joined by five ships off Rochefort under Villeneuve, and then hasten to Boulogne to convoy the flotilla. The rôle of the squadron at Brest was to be passive, although reports were spread far and wide that the ships there were to take an army to Ireland. This was done so that Cornwallis, blockading that port, might not form a junction with the squadron in the Downs for the purpose of opposing the crossing of the vast armament from the northern seaport. If all these combinations were successfully carried out Napoleon would have sixteen sail-of-the-line ready for the master-stroke. Everything depended on whether the English blockading squadrons off Toulon, Cadiz, Rochefort, and in the Downs could be eluded.
On the 8th April Nelson again wrote, “We are on the eve of great events,” and proceeded to tell his correspondent that two sail-of-the-line had “put their heads outside Toulon,” and a little later “they all came out. We have had a gale of wind and calm since; therefore I do not know whether they are returned to port or have kept the sea. I have only to wish to get alongside of them with the present fleet under my command; so highly officered and manned, the event ought not to be doubted.”
“If we go on playing out and in, we shall some day get at them,” he tells Frere.
Monsieur La Touche was merely exercising his ships; the time for the grand coup was not yet come. Nelson’s opinion now was that the Brest fleet and a squadron he does not name, but probably that at Rochefort, were destined for the Mediterranean “either before or after they may have thrown their cargo of troops on shore in Ireland. Egypt and the Morea supposed to be their next object after their English and Irish schemes.” On the 24th May the French made a further excursion, five sail-of-the-line, three frigates, and several smaller vessels came out of the harbour, which was being watched by a small squadron under Rear-Admiral Campbell. Nelson did not believe in showing the whole of his available resources to the enemy. By being out of sight he hoped to entice the enemy to leave their safe anchorage: “My system is the very contrary of blockading.” He was delighted that Campbell did not allow the French to bring him to action with the small resources at his disposal, which is another example of Nelson’s cautious methods. He thanked the admiral by letter, and concluded by saying, “I have no doubt but an opportunity will offer of giving them fair battle.”