But what must have been the most serious source of anxiety to Japan was the indifference which Europe and America were beginning to show to her successes. At first it had seemed profitable to Great Britain and Germany that Russia and Japan should be drawn into war, for when they were exhausted the hands of both would be tied—ours in Europe, and Japan’s in Asia. Nevertheless, it was not to the interest of Europe generally to allow the triumph of the Japanese in the battlefields of Manchuria to become absolute. A victorious Japan might join with China, and raise the standard of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The extinction of all European and American enterprises in Asia would be the first object of this new great Power, and the expulsion of Europeans from Asia would be the end. There is already little enough room on the Continent of Europe. Without the markets of the wide world she could not exist, and the cries of “America for the Americans,” “Asia for the Asiatics,” “Africa for the Africans,” are of serious import for her. But the danger is approaching, and is so imminent that the Powers of Europe will be forced to sink their differences and unite in order to withstand the attempt of the young nations[58] to drive old Europe home into the narrow shell which she has long since outgrown. We might have taken advantage of this change in international feeling, and have tried to close the money markets of the world to Japan. Only one decisive victory on our part was wanted to bring about a very serious reaction both in Japan and in the army in the field. If we had exhausted her financial resources, and had continued the war, we might soon have compelled her to seek an honourable peace, which would have been advantageous to us.
At Mukden we fought with a shortage in establishment of 300,000 men; we began the war with inconsiderable forces; we conducted it under the most unfavourable conditions, and without the support of the country; we were, moreover, weakened by disturbances in the interior, and were connected with Russia only by a single-track weak line. In these impossible conditions we put 300,000 of the enemy _hors de combat_, and had 600,000 rifles ready at Hsi-ping-kai at a time when they were beginning to flag. If we attained such results, can it be said that our army accomplished but little? Is it fair to continue applying the epithet “Disgraceful” to the war? It cannot be denied that both the troops and their leaders did less in the time at their disposal than they might have done if properly supported by the country; but by the summer of 1905 conditions had begun to change in our favour. The conquered are always judged severely, and the leaders should naturally be the first to bear the responsibility for disaster to the troops under them. We can only be judged as acquitted because of our readiness to continue the struggle—a readiness which was created, and grew stronger in the army in spite of disaster. We believed in the possibility and certainty of victory, and if it had not been for the serious internal disturbances in Russia, we should have undoubtedly been able to prove the truth of our belief in battle.