[3] Mr Fortescue in his work makes it the 23rd. I cannot conceive the basis for such an error. The whole story of the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th is in the French archives, together with full details of the capitulation on the 29th and 30th.
[4] As usual, there is a contradiction in the records. The French record definitely ascribes the proposal to Marlborough. Marlborough, in a letter to his wife of 5th August, as definitely ascribes it to Surville; and there is no positive evidence one way or the other, though Louis' rejection of the terms and the ability of calculation and the character of the two men certainly make it more probable that Marlborough and not Surville was the author of the proposition.
[5] The dispute as to who was the author of the suggestion for an armistice is further illumined by this refusal on the part of the allies. The proposal to contain Tournai and yet to have free their vast forces in operation elsewhere, if a trifle crude, was certainly to their advantage, and as certainly to the disadvantage of the French.
[6] This excellent phrase is Mr Fortescue's.
[7] Technically the line of defence was forced, for the line of Trouille was but a continuation of the lines of La Bassée--Douai--Valenciennes. So far as strategical results were concerned, the withdrawal of Villars behind the forest barrier was equivalent to the reconstruction of new lines, and in the event the action of Malplaquet proved that new defensive position to be strong enough to prevent the invasion of France. On the other hand, there is little doubt that if Villars had been in a little more strength he would have elected to fight on the old lines and not behind the woods.
It must further be remarked that if the operations had not been prolonged as they were by the existence of the posts on the lines, notably at St Ghislain, the defensive position of the French would probably have been forced and their whole line broken as early as September 4th.
[8] It is remarkable that these two roads, which are the chief feature both of the landscape and the local military topography, and which are of course as straight as taut strings, are represented upon Mr Fortescue's map (vol. i. p. 424) as winding lanes, or, to speak more accurately, are not represented at all. In this perhaps the learned historian of the British army was misled by Coxe's atlas to Marlborough's campaign, a picturesque but grossly inaccurate compilation. The student who desires to study this action in detail will do well to consult the Belgian Ordnance Map on the scale of 1/40,000 contours at 5 metres, section Roisin, and the French General Staff Map, 1/80,000, section Maubeuge, south-western quarter; the action being fought exactly on the frontier between Belgium and France, both maps are necessary. For the general strategic position the French 1/200,000 in colours, sheet Maubeuge, and the adjoining sheet, Lille, are sufficient.