The prices thus fixed are monopoly prices--that is to say, they are determined by the action of a number of competing capitals which at a certain point agree to suspend their conflict and act as a single capital; when the bidding is above a certain figure they are many, when it is below that figure they are one. The condition in such a trade is one of limited monopoly. The prices fixed by such trade agreements will generally be different from those of a single firm with the absolute monopoly of a market, whose prices are arranged to yield the maximum net profit on the capital engaged. For since the economies of competition and some of the economies of production would be far greater for a single producing firm with a monopoly, the schedule of supply prices measuring the expenses of producing the different quantities of goods will be different, and this difference will be reflected in a different scale of non-competitive market prices from that which would issue from a trade agreement. Moreover, a loose voluntary compact between trade rivals yields a monopoly of a far feebler order than does the unity of a single capital. If a scale of prices were fixed which would yield a considerably higher profit than the market rate, the temptation to secure a larger share of trade by secret underbidding through commissions, drawbacks, or otherwise, or even by an open cutting of rates, is very powerful. Moreover, the ability of a number of firms with conflicting interests to secure this monopoly by quick and vigorous repression of the attempts of outside capital to come in either for the purpose of sharing the higher profits, or of being bought out, is far less than in the case of a single monopolist firm. So the scale of prices fixed by a number of competing firms will generally be nearer to the competition prices than would be the case with the prices of a single monopolist.
§ 5. The recognition of the advantages of limiting competition by price tariffs, and the experience of the difficulty of maintaining such tariffs, lead competing businesses to take further steps in the curtailment of competition. Where a powerful trade opinion can be focussed on an offender against the scale, where he can be boycotted or otherwise subjected to punishment, and where outsiders can be prevented from intruding into the trade, a common scale of profitable prices can often be maintained with the verbal or even the tacit consent of those concerned. This is the case in many manufactures where the fixed and well-known character of the goods makes a close price-list possible. Retail dealers in local markets are often able to keep a close adherence to a rigid scale by the pure force of _esprit de corps_. The price of bread, meat, milk, coals, and other articles sold locally by well-known measures, is seldom, if ever, regulated by free competition among the vendors. In articles where more depends upon the individual quality of wares, and where a rigid tariff is less easily fixed and less easily maintained, as in the case of vegetables, fruit, fish, and groceries, trade agreements are less easy to maintain. Still more difficult is it to maintain a tariff for articles of dress or adornment of the person or the house, and in other articles where the consumer is less confined to a narrow local market.