This true picture of our country, while it demonstrates the impracticability of subjecting it, explains the reasons why our exertions have always disappointed both our friends and our enemies. If then, as the fact is, the mere change of position at the option of the foe can so lull our people to rest, how much more are we to expect it will follow from the capture of a considerable part of his force. To reason rightly on the late events, we must admit the ability to make greater exertions, and then seek the means of calling them forth. This, Sir, can only be accomplished by pecuniary aid. The Chevalier observes that the King's obligations to us have been exceeded. This is but a narrow idea. If the King is engaged to support the war until our Independence is established, his simple object of inquiry will be, how that can be speedily and cheaply accomplished? It is certain that America ought to do everything in her power, and you may assure the Court, that Congress and the servants of Congress are sensible of this duty and determined to comply with it. But it is in vain to think of breaking the bounds of possibility, and equally vain to think of changing the nature of man.

Let me add, that there is little propriety in reproaching Americans with faults inseparable from humanity. Besides this, the exertions of our country have really been very great, and as soon as more consistency shall have been put in the administration, they will again be great; but this is the period of weakness between the convulsive labors of enthusiasm and the sound and regular operations of order and government.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Volume XII — Part 45

There is in the end of the Chevalier's letter a hint in relation to our commerce, which although it does not immediately apply to the present purpose, must not pass unnoticed. That an indirect commerce has taken place with England is true, and that France has in a great measure been the cause of it is equally true. Men will naturally buy where they can obtain things most cheaply. The prime cost of goods, though a great object in time of peace is not equally so in time of war. The freight and the insurance are then so high that a small difference of danger or convenience will counterbalance a great difference of price. When France, by subscribing to the principles of the armed neutrality, gave her enemy the means of bringing her manufactures in safety to our neighborhood, she tempted our merchants to buy those manufactures. She added the motives of interest to the force of habit, and ought not, therefore, to be surprised that such cogent principles have had effect. One mode remained, that of convoying the trade between France and America, and that mode has been neglected. I am happy, however, to observe, that this British commerce is dwindling very fast. The war with Holland has given it one deadly blow, and if our privateers are once more freed from the shackles too hastily imposed upon them, I cannot doubt, but that the trade of this country will flow directly to France, as indeed it ought to do.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Volume XII — Part 45