The conspirators against cardinal Beatoun kept possession of the castle after his death. The regent had assembled an army and laid siege to it, from a desire not so much to avenge the murder of the cardinal, at whose fall he secretly rejoiced, as to comply with the importunity of the clergy, and to release his eldest son, who had been retained by Beatoun as a pledge of his father’s fidelity, and had now fallen into the hands of the conspirators. But the besieged, having obtained assistance from England, baffled all his skill; and a treaty was at last concluded, by which they engaged to deliver up the castle to the regent, upon his procuring to them from Rome a pardon for the cardinal’s murder. The pardon was obtained; but the conspirators, alarmed, or affecting to be alarmed, { 47} at the contradictory terms in which it was expressed, refused to perform their stipulation, and the regent felt himself unable, without foreign aid, to enforce a compliance. In this interval, a number of persons, who were harassed for their attachment to the reformed sentiments, repaired to the castle, where they enjoyed the free exercise of their religion.[66]
Writers, unfriendly to Knox, have endeavoured to fix an accusation upon him respecting the assassination of cardinal Beatoun. Some have ignorantly asserted, that he was one of the conspirators.[67] Others, better informed, have argued that he made himself accessary to their crime, by taking shelter among them.[68] With more plausibility, others have appealed { 48} to his writings, as a proof that he vindicated the deed of the conspirators as laudable, or at least innocent. I know that some of Knox’s vindicators have denied this charge, and maintain that he justified it only so far as it was the work of God, or a just retribution in providence for the crimes of which the cardinal had been guilty, without approving the conduct of those who were the instruments of punishing him.[69] The just judgment of heaven is, I acknowledge, the chief thing to which he directs the attention of his readers; at the same time, I think no one who carefully reads what he has written on this subject, can doubt that he justified the action of the conspirators.[70] The truth is, he held the opinion, that persons who, according to the law of God, and the just laws of society, have forfeited their lives, by the commission of flagrant crimes, such as notorious murderers and tyrants, may warrantably be put to death by private individuals, provided all redress, in the ordinary course of justice, is rendered impossible, in consequence of the offenders having usurped the executive authority, or being systematically protected by oppressive rulers. This is an opinion of the same kind with that of tyrannicide, held by so many of the ancients, and defended by Buchanan, in his dialogue, _De jure regni apud Scotos_. It is a principle, I confess, of very dangerous application, and extremely liable to be abused by factious, fanatical, and desperate men, as a pretext { 49} for perpetrating the most nefarious deeds. It would be unjust, however, on this account, to confound it with the principle, which, by giving to individuals a liberty to revenge their own quarrels, legitimates assassination, a practice which was exceedingly common in that age. I may add, that there have been instances of persons, not invested with public authority, taking the execution of punishment into their own hands, whom we may scruple to load with an aggravated charge of murder, although we cannot approve of their conduct.[71]