These reasons do not apply to a suit upon such judgment in another State; because,
First, The title to real estate is not thereby affected.
Second, There is no remedy in any of the courts of the State where suit is brought upon the judgment, either by direct application to the court in which it was rendered, or by suit against the attorney who appeared without authority.
The fact that a party must resort to a distant forum outside the limits of his own State for redress has frequently been held to be an inadequate or insufficient remedy, and almost equivalent to none at all. Buckmaster v. Grundy, 3 Gilman (Ill.), 626, 630, 631; Tribbles v. Toul, 7 Mon. 455; Green v. Campbell, 2 Jones (Eq.), N. C. 448; Richardson v. Williams, 3 id. 119; Smith v. Field, 6 Dana (Ky.), 364; Taylor v. Stowell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 176, 177; Pander v. Cox, 28 Ga. 306, 307; Key v. Robinson, 29 id. 34; Lirch v. Foster, 1 Ves. Sr. 88; Edminson v. Baxter, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 112; Graham v. Tarkersby, 15 Ala. N. S. 644; Hinrichson v. Reinbach, 27 Ill. 301.
As the evidence offered by Lybrand that the attorney who appeared for him did so without authority does not contradict, but simply explains, the record, he was not estopped. Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 186; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 338; Barden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; White v. Jones, 38 Ill. 163; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Ill. 200; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, and cases cited therein; Haskin v. Blackmer, 20 Iowa, 162, and cases cited therein; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Wilson v. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 6 Leigh, 570; Price v. Ward, 1 Dutch. 229; Bigelow on Estoppel, 226; 6 Robinson's Practice, 438; 2 American Leading Cases (5th ed.), 633, 642, and cases cited; Freeman on Judgments, sect. 563 (2d ed. p. 559).
The recitals in the record of a judgment of one State, when sought to be enforced in another, can be contradicted as to any jurisdictional fact, notwithstanding their conclusive effect in the State where the judgment was rendered, and notwithstanding the constitutional provision 'that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State,' and the act of Congress passed to carry it into effect. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v. Gas-Light & Coke Co., 19 id. 59; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, per Marcy, J.; Rope v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 332-337; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 453; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Tex. 551; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray, 591.
Mr. Sidney S. Harris for the defendants in error.
The excluded evidence, if admitted, would not have impeached the validity of the judgment.
Hall and Lybrand were partners. The suit in New York which resulted in the judgment related wholly to their partnership transactions. The authority of one partner to employ an attorney to represent the firm in a suit, and to enter the appearance of all its members, rests on the undisputed doctrine, that such partner, in all things relating to the firm transactions, can lawfully represent the firm, unless restricted by agreement. Parsons on Partn. 174.
It is clear that one partner can make contracts for the partnership which will not only bind it to the extent of its assets, but which may lead to the ultimate individual liability of all the partners. This is a necessary legal result of his exercise of partnership authority; and either partner, acting for the firm, can employ an attorney to resist a recovery in a suit against it and to defend its interests. Parsons on Partn. 175, note; Harrison v. Stickney, 7 T. R. 208, Dampier, arguendo; Collyer on Partn., sects. 441, 678, and note; Winship v. The Bank of the United States, 5 Pet. 561; Bennett v. Stickney, 17 Vt. 531; Everson v. Gehrman, 10 How. Pr. 301; Taylor v. Coryell, 12 S. & R. 250.
One partner can bona fide admit service of process for both, and the judgment rendered will not be set aside on the motion of the other partner. Olwell v. McLaughlin, 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 316; Lippman v. Judson, 1 Code, N. S. 161, note; Hammond v. Harris, 2 How. Pr. 331; Crane v. French, 1 Wend. 311; Grazebrook v. McCrudie, 17 id. 437; Blodget v. Conklin, 9 How. Pr. 442.
If the partnership was dissolved, Hall still had the power to act for the firm in respect to any transactions which occurred when the partnership continued. Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104, per Lord Mansfield; Pritchard v. Draper, 1 Russ. & My1. 191; Vinal v. Burrill, 16 Pick. 401; Bridge v. Gray, 14 id. 55; Simpson v. Geddes, 2 Bay, 533; Garland v. Agee, 7 Leigh, 362; Woodworth v. Downer, 13 Vt. 522.