[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III.

[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_, _Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.

The Approach to Philosophy — Part 41

[64:6] Rousseau: _Confessions_, Book IV, p. 125.

The Approach to Philosophy — Part 41

[65:7] William James: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 35. The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.

The Approach to Philosophy — Part 41

[67:8] Chadwick: _Theodore Parker_, p. 18.

[67:9] Stevenson: _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 229.

[68:10] Thomas à Kempis: _Imitation of Christ_, Chap. XIX. Translation by Stanhope, p. 44.

[69:11] St. Augustine: _Confessions_, Book I, Chap. I. Translation in Schaff: _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, Vol. I, p. 129.

[71:12] James: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 203.

[78:14] Warren: _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 14.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION

[Sidenote: Résumé of Psychology of Religion.]

§ 28. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling, or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.

§ 29. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive of the fact that religion, just because it _is_ belief, is not wholly a matter for psychology. For religion _means to be true_, and thus submits itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The psychological study of religion is misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical criticism. The religious man takes his religion not as a narcotic, but as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. And the charm of truth cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be described, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point of therapeutics. Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their patient's experience.[83:1] There would be no difference between priests and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want to dwell constantly in a fictitious world, even if it be after his own heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its creeds and its controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose truth would justify or contradict it.