Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980; second edition 2011) is a book by John Finnis first published by Oxford University Press, as part of the Clarendon Law Series. Finnis develops a philosophy of Law in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas – Natural Law. His presentation and defence of Natural Law can be explored from three perspectives. First, polemical, by contradistinction with other philosophies of Law. Second, through its particular methodology, based on practical reasoning. Third, through its substantive content in the form of basic human goods. This article offers a brief overview of each of these perspectives. In addition, his 2011 edition included an extensive Postcript, which is briefly discussed in the 4th Section. A brief appraisal of the book is included in the final section.

Polemical

Finnis critiques a number of authors and philosophical traditions, thereby offering polemical support for his conception of Natural Law. An illustration of this (by no means exhaustive) follows below.

Natural Law and Natural Rights

Consequentialism (and utilitarianism). Finnis argues that consequentialist arguments are frustrated by the impossibility of double-guessing consequences and the impossibility of maximising incommensurable ends and choices. David Hume. Finnis acknowledges the validity of Hume's critique of Samuel Clarke's Natural Law on the basis that it derives moral obligations (“ought”) from the fact of things or actions being “good” (“is”). However, Finnis claims that this is not applicable to his own version of Natural Law where the moral obligation (“ought”) and its “goodness” derive from practical reasoning. Francisco Suarez. Finnis criticises Suarez for misinterpreting Aquinas by, among other things, adopting a “rationalist” view of Natural Law focused on the (presumed) ability of the intellect to recognise whether a given choice accords with human nature or not. H. L. A. Hart. Hart was Finnis’ PhD supervisor and the force behind his writing the book. However, he regrets that Hart's The concept of Law refuses to engage with moral content and fails to recognise moral purpose in legal punishment (as opposed to mere vindictiveness). Immanuel Kant. Finnis argues that Kant reduces human nature to practical reason devoid of moral content. John Rawls: Finnis argues that Rawls’ original position in A Theory of Justice excludes the possibility of adopting positions as matter of principle, e.g., including positions that might clash with those of others. The result is an impoverished view of human flourishing. Joseph Raz. Finnis corrects Raz's Practical Reason and Norms's misinterpretation of his Natural Law. Robert Nozick: Finnis argues against Nozick's notion of coercive State (in Anarchy, State and Utopia) noting that individuals (and not only the State) owe a duty of distributive justice to other individuals. Plato. Finnis attributes to Plato the origin of Natural Law conceptions, further developed by Aristotle and Aquinas. This includes a contemplative notion of man's relation to the divine. Yet, Finnis critiques communistic conceptions of human society based on Plato's Republic because they overlook the importance of human commitment. He distinguishes such notions from subsidiarity. Ronald Dworkin. Finnis critiques Dworkin for emptying the legal institution of moral content.

Natural Law and Natural Rights

Among others, Finnis critiques Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and both critiques and praises, John Austin, W.N. Hohfeld and Max Weber. Whilst following them, he also notes substantive limitations in Aquinas’ and Aristotle's accounts of Natural Law.

Natural Law and Natural Rights

Methodology

The methodology that gives rise to Finnis's conception of Natural Law is based on practical reasoning or reasonableness. For Finnis, practical reasoning is the making of choices about the kind of life that we want to live. Such choices are guided through participation in (through a natural apprehension of), and (subsequent) reflection on, the basic goods (listed in the next section). Choices, and acts that follow from such choices, may prioritise some basic goods over others but cannot overlook any of them, or involve arbitrary preferences among persons – such arbitrariness is avoided through a benevolent impartial judgment (as distinguished from the ‘veil of ignorance') - and will seek the good of the whole community or common good. The common good includes distributive and commutative obligations of justice to others. Morality is practical reasoning which makes life worth living by respecting these conditions.