The 9th RCT commander agreed, and the responsibility of delivering the first punch lay with the 5th Marines.[286]
Time and chance were against the Brigade throughout 16 August and the following morning. Banking on the use of 145 Army trucks, Craig and Murray hoped to move quickly on the 16th, in order to have one infantry battalion take over Observation Hill and the other two available for the attack on the 17th. Unfortunately, only 43 trucks were actually provided, with the result that time schedules were thrown off and troops forced to march long distances the night before the attack.[287]
[287] Brig SAR, basic rpt; Annex How; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.
At 1900, 16 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion entrucked at Miryang and rode to the 5th Marines CP about 3,000 yards behind the front. Dismounting, 3/5 marched to Cloverleaf Hill and relieved the 34th Infantry on position. Control of the area south of the MSR passed to Taplett at 0445, 17 August.[288]
The 2d Battalion proceeded on foot to its assembly area near Cloverleaf Hill at 0130 on the 17th, and Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s men got little sleep as they prepared for the jump-off a few hours later. Owing to the shortage of trucks, the 1st Battalion arrived at the forward assembly area several hours later than planned.[289]
Overloaded trucks had shuttled Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery battalion forward on 16 August. Although registration fires were completed by evening, the haste of the displacement and the doubtful information at the front left much to be desired from the standpoint of accuracy.[290]
[290] Annex item to Brig SAR; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.
While Obong-ni Ridge was known to be heavily defended, it was generally thought that Hill 207--Brigade Objective Two--would be the hard nut to crack. And the potential of Objective Three, towering Hill 311, was by no means minimized in preattack estimates.[291] Later events proved these assumptions to be the reverse of reality, but Marine planners could do no better with the meager intelligence then available.
[291] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; Murray, 15 Feb 54.
The regimental commander and General Craig concluded that a frontal assault on Obong-ni Ridge with a column of battalions was the only answer to the problems posed by the terrain and situation.