Chapter 10.—Whether Our Wills are
Ruled by Necessity.
Wherefore, neither is that
necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to
make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable
them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity, and
to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not
to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they
would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be
called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we
be unwilling effects what it can effect,—as, for instance, the
necessity of death,—it is manifest that our wills by which we
live up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we
do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly
not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing
itself,—for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not,—for
we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define
necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary
that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and
such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that
necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put
the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we
should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and
foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say
that He cannot die or fall into error,—for this is in such a way
impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of
less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though
He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called
omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of
His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He
would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some
things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when
we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free
choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and
do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which
destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But when any one suffers anything, being unwilling by the will of another, even in that case will retains its essential validity, —we do not mean the will of the party who