Constant rates applied over long distances on the same line almost inevitably tend to pass over into a system of equality of rates over _different lines_.[230] The necessity was evident enough in the Milk Rate case. This phase of the matter may theoretically best be discussed by reference to the following diagram. Suppose A, B, C, and D to represent any four inland "common points." It remains to show how it comes about that they all finally enjoy equal rates to all four seaports, regardless of location. Each appears to be naturally tributary to some one of the seaports by a dominant or short-line route. In each instance this route properly rules the rate. Moreover, the four seaports may be considered for traffic purposes as equally and interchangeably distant from one another without regard to location. This follows from the fact that, except in extreme instances, rates by water do not vary according to distance, so small is the cost of mere propulsion by comparison with the terminal costs. In other words, the rate is the same from Wilmington to Brunswick or Savannah as to its next neighbor Charleston. From this it follows, further, that Wilmington, Savannah, and Brunswick can all reach B--the point to which Charleston is nearest--on even terms. They may each have a direct line to B; but, as compared with a possible combined low water rate to Charleston and a low direct rail rate inland to B, the Charleston route may be at least able to hold its own. All three outside competitors, then, are on even terms with one another in respect of access to B. But how does Charleston stand towards B as against the field? We have already concluded that a roundabout route must be allowed to meet, though not to undercut, the ruling rate. Such a roundabout route from Wilmington on this diagram to its own natural tributary A could be, and as a matter of fact is, made by passing around by way of Charleston or any other seaport. Charleston wishes to share in this trade at A, and may reach it by similar tactics. It stands towards A precisely as Wilmington stands towards B. They finally agree to enjoy both A and B on even terms. But, as we have already seen, the admission of Wilmington to B is equivalent to the admission of all the rest. Whence it comes about that all four establish B as a "common point." And of course the same procedure fixes all the others, A, C, and D in the same way. In the Savannah Fertilizer case[231] it appeared that there were no fewer than 148 points in ten states from Louisiana to Kentucky, to which rates on fertilizers were absolutely the same from each of the four seaports. The degree of local discrimination of course was negligible at the remoter places; but it augmented in proportion as the immediate neighborhood of each seaport was approached. The apparent anomaly was greatest in a north and south direction along the seacoast. Thus Dinsmore, Florida, was 275 miles from Charleston and only 160 miles from Savannah, yet the rates from both points were the same. The governing feature usually was the entire equality of coastwise water rates, regardless of distance, which in turn compelled the land lines to follow suit.