The illustration taken from Russia Post with permission. The slogan in Russian says “Give birth to meat.” The Kremlin’s promotion of militaristic patriotism has had a strong effect on Russian society. But the Soviet legacy of cynicism and “double-think” is actually working to mitigate it. Global Voices is reprinting an article by Mariya Omelicheva, a professor of the National Defence University (US) from the Russia Post with their permission. There is a new all-Russian youth movement called The Movement of the First, organized on the initiative of the Russian leadership. Eighty percent of adult Russians support the idea of an organization to instill patriotism and “traditional Russian values” in Russia’s youth. Many Russian schools have opened memorial spaces to honor Russian “heroes” from the “special military operation” in Ukraine (the Russian government calls the Russian Invasion of Ukraine that). President Putin formalized these practices in a presidential order. Russia’s top e-commerce and shopping websites — Wildberries and Ozon — have noted record sales of goods with the logos of PMC Wagner (which is a contracted private army where mostly convicts serve). For nearly a decade, the Russian government has engaged in a top-down campaign of promoting militarized patriotism. The main purpose of this was to legitimize the regime, in the name of defending the Russian nation. This systematic campaign, relying on traditional and social media, cultural and religious institutions, and schools, has left a deep imprint on Russians, resulting in the emergence of a new archetype of the Russian citizen: homo militaris. Characterized by a conspiratorial mindset and embracing military prowess as a symbol of Russia’s greatness, homo militaris admires Russia’s military victories, especially in relation to the sacrificial heroism in World War II. Without clamoring for violence, homo militaris lends unconditional support to any actions of the government and military as a trademark of patriotic solidarity. Russia’s failed attempt at rapidly conquering Ukraine did not stop the evolution of homo militaris. On the contrary, it provided a context for war myths. However, the Russian government has not to date succeeded in translating people’s beliefs in mythologized war into a willingness to volunteer as soldiers. A critical limitation of Russian militarized patriotism is that it bears the Soviet and post-Soviet legacies of political cynicism, as well as the habit of finding workarounds in dealing with the government. Those habits commonly resulted in displays of symbolic patriotism in public, along with deceiving the state in private, to avoid personal commitments. Deluded by anti-Russian conspiracy theories and narratives, homo militaris has accepted a view that Russia is locked in an existential rivalry with other powerful nations. Homo militaris is a person who believes in “organic” solidarity with the government and regards support for its actions, however brutal, as a sign of patriotism. In the 1990s, Russian citizens who emerged from the Soviet Union’s collapse were more introspective in their search for the sources of Russia’s problems and oriented to the West. Things began to change rather quickly with the political advent of Vladimir Putin. Whereas in the 1990s roughly one half of Russians were either unsure or did not believe that Russia had external foes, by the 2000s nearly 80 percent had developed this view. Since 2014, the US and Ukraine have consistently come to be named as two of the most “unfriendly” nations. In 2021 a record 83 percent believed that Russia had enemies, with 62 percent fearing yet another world war. The percentage of Russians who consider Russia a great power jumped from 31 percent in 1999 to 68 percent in the wake of Crimea’s annexation in 2014, and has been hovering above 70 percent since 2017. The meaning that the Russians ascribe to the idea of a “great power” has also changed during this time frame. Whereas in 1999 only 30 percent of Russians viewed the country’s military might and nuclear arsenal as constitutive of great power status, by 2015 this number had risen to 51 percent, and has not decreased significantly since then. Achievements such as the country’s economic development, the population’s overall well-being and scientific and cultural achievements have given way to the victory in the “Great Patriotic War” (WWII) as the symbol of Russia’s greatness. While views on WWII and its place in Russia’s 20th-century history have remained stable, a feeling of shame for the dissolution of the Soviet Union has grown. As military might has become central to Russian people’s image of their country, their views on the Russian military have also evolved.
Politics Journal
Building the homo militaris: Russia’s long game of militarized patriotism
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