The entire command encamped on the battle field in the neighborhood of Trevilian Station for the night. The next morning Gregg was set at work tearing up the railroad toward Louisa Courthouse. The First division was given a rest until the afternoon when, at about three o'clock, although it was Sunday, the order came for the First division to proceed in the direction of Gordonsville. In the meantime, the forces of Hampton and Lee had united and, as will be seen, had planned to stop Sheridan's further progress at all hazards. There is some reason to believe that a part of Breckinridge's infantry had come out from Gordonsville to reinforce Hampton. Such was the impression at the time, and one at least, of Sheridan's commanders, states in his report that he was confronted by infantry. The writer is of the opinion that the "infantry" was Butler's dismounted cavalry which, when in a good position as they were that day, could do as good fighting as any infantry in the confederate service.
The Michigan brigade moved out first and the Sixth had the advance. The order was to proceed to a certain point named and then halt until the division closed up. Memory does not recall what the place was, but is quite clear as to that being the specific direction given by General Custer to the officer in command of the advance regiment. We had gone but a short distance, not more than a mile or two at most, when the advance guard reported the enemy entrenched across the way. Skirmishing began at once between our mounted men in front and dismounted confederates behind breastworks of considerable strength. A squadron was deployed and Sergeant Avery was directed to make his way far enough into the woods to find, if possible, what we had in our front. He came back in about ten minutes and reported that the breastworks in our immediate front were thoroughly manned, and that he had seen a column of at least a thousand men moving into the entrenchments on the enemy's right, in front of our left flank. He was sent back to give Custer this information, and the general came up and ordered the entire regiment to be dismounted to fight on foot. The Sixth was put in on the right of the road and directly thereafter the Seventh was sent in on the left. It did not take long to demonstrate that two regiments were not enough and the First and Fifth went into the action on the right of the Sixth. Then Torbert reinforced the line with the Reserve brigade and a portion of the Second, all under Merritt. The entire division became engaged. Several assaults were made upon the confederate line but without success. They were in each instance repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee got in on the right flank of the division and inflicted severe damage upon the Reserve brigade. We have never been able to understand why, if it was intended to break the enemy's line, Gregg's division was not brought into the engagement to protect that flank. General Merritt in his report intimates that he had to do more than his share of fighting; that when the Reserve brigade advanced to the assault on the right it was supposed that the attack would be pressed on the left; that it was not so pressed and that his brigade suffered unduly on that account. This is another case of a man being unable to see all that is going on in a battle. The Michigan brigade was on the left of the line. It was the first brigade engaged. It began the fight and stayed in it till the end. Harder fighting has rarely been done than that which fell to the Michigan men in that battle. Several attempts were made to drive the enemy from their front. The First Michigan especially made a charge across an open field in the face of a terrible fire from behind breastworks, going half way across before they were repulsed. When the First Michigan could not stand before a storm of bullets, no other regiment in the cavalry corps need try. That is a certainty. The losses in killed and wounded were very severe, as will be shown in a table printed at the end of this chapter.