Beside, it is a most improper and fallacious instance; for an oath, being an invocation of a true or false God to judge in a case, is an action of a spiritual and religious nature, whatever the subject matter be about which it is taken, whether civil or religious: but a law or constitution may be civil or religious, as the subject about which it is conversant is either civil, merely concerning bodies or goods; or religious, concerning soul and worship.

_Peace._ Their fifth head is concerning the magistrates’ power in making of laws.

The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience Discussed and Mr. Cotton's Letter Examined and Answered — Part 178

“First, they have power to publish and apply such civil laws in a state, as either are expressed in the word of God in Moses’s judicials—to wit, so far as they are of general and moral equity, and so binding all nations in all ages—to be deducted by way of general consequence and proportion from the word of God.

The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience Discussed and Mr. Cotton's Letter Examined and Answered — Part 178

“For in a free state no magistrate hath power over the bodies, goods, lands, liberties of a free people, but by their free consents. And because free men are not free lords of their own estates, but are only stewards unto God, therefore they may not give their free consents to any magistrate to dispose of their bodies, goods, lands, liberties, at large as themselves please, but as God, the sovereign Lord of all, alone. And because the word is a perfect rule, as well of righteousness as of holiness, it will be therefore necessary that neither the people give consent, nor that the magistrate take power to dispose of the bodies, goods, lands, liberties of the people, but according to the laws and rules of the word of God.

The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience Discussed and Mr. Cotton's Letter Examined and Answered — Part 178

“Secondly, in making laws about civil and indifferent things about the commonweal,

“First, he hath no power given him of God to make what laws he please, either in restraining from or constraining to the use of indifferent things; because that which is indifferent in its nature, may sometimes be inexpedient in its use, and consequently unlawful, 1 Cor. ii. 5, it having been long since defended upon good ground, _Quicquid non expedit, quatenus non expedit, non licet._

“Secondly, he hath no power to make any such laws about indifferent things, wherein nothing good or evil is shown to the people, but only on principally the mere authority or will of the imposer, for the observance of them, Col. ii. 21, 22; 1 Cor. vii. 23, compared with Eph. vi. 6.