The contention of appellant's counsel is that, although the Mexican consul had possession of the record from Mexico and the depositions of the witnesses therein contained, which embodied the proceedings had before the judge at Guadalajara, Mexico, including the testimony of witnesses, which appeared to the judge amply sufficient to justify an order for the apprehension of the accused, nevertheless there was still necessary, in order for the commissioner to take jurisdiction to hear the application, that either the record from Mexico should be attached to the complaint, or that the complaint should disclose upon its face the sources of the consul's information. This record from Mexico was not only before the Mexican consul when he made the complaint against Yordi, now under consideration, but the commissioner was thoroughly familiar with it, as it had been introduced in evidence before him upon the hearing of the first complaint.
Judge Maxey was of opinion that, as depositions from a foreign country were admissible in evidence upon the hearing before the commissioner, they were also to be admitted for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction in the commissioner to issue the warrant; and as, in this case, the depositions were in themselves sufficient to satisfy the commissioner that the prosecution against the accused was based upon real grounds, and not upon mere suspicion of guilt, it was not indispensable to the jurisdiction of the commissioner that the record and depositions from Mexico should be actually fastened to the complaint when they were in the custody and keeping of the consul, and the commissioner was already in possession of the information which they contained. We concur in these views.
The general doctrine in respect of extradition complaints is well stated by Judge Coxe in Ex parte Sternaman, 77 Fed. 596, 597, as follows:
'The complaint should set forth clearly and briefly the offense charged. It need not be drawn with the formal precision of an indictment. If it be sufficiently explicit to inform the accused person of the precise nature of the charge against him, it is sufficient. The extreme technicality with which these proceedings were formerly conducted has given place to a more liberal practice, the object being to reach a correct decision upon the main question,-Is there reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed? The complaint may, in some instances, be upon information and belief. The exigencies may be such that the criminal may escape punishment unless he is promptly apprehended by the representatives of the country whose law he has violated. From the very nature of the case it may often happen that such representative can have no personal knowledge of the crime. If the offense be one of the treaty crimes, and if it be stated clearly and explicitly, so that the accused knows EXACTLY WHAT THE CHARGE IS, THE COMPLAINT is sufficient to authorize the commissioner to act. The foregoing propositions are, it is thought, sustained by the following authorities: Re Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345, Fed. Cas. No. 4,645; Re Roth, 15 Fed. 506; Re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414, Fed. Cas. No. 6,369; Ex parte Van Hoven, 4 Dill. 415, Fed. Cas. No. 16,859; Re Breen, 73 Fed. 458; Ex parte Lane, 6 Fed. 34; Re Herres, 33 Fed. 165; Castro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed. 93; Re Macdonnell, 11 Blatchf. 79, Fed. Cas. No. 8,771.'
It was argued that this court had held otherwise, particularly in Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 45 L. ed. 577, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406, where Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion, declared that several counts of the complaint were obviously insufficient, 'since the charges were made solely upon information and belief, and no attempt was made even to set forth the sources of information, or the grounds of affiant's belief.' But Mr. Justice Brown further said (pp. 375, 376):