"The principles in nature all existed, before they were discovered by man. Their being discovered, neither changed their nature, nor made them any more true. What consternation a total eclipse of the sun, or of the moon must have produced, before their cause was known? They are now viewed, especially that of the latter, among the common occurrences of nature. Yea, many of the operations of nature, which are now perfectly understood by chemists, could they be viewed by the common people, who know not their causes, they would be inclined to believe they were supernatural. At least, it would not be difficult to make them believe so, especially when this knowledge was confined to a few, and those few were so disposed. These remarks are not designed to do away the force of any arguments which may be founded on miracles; for this is no proof that miracles may not exist; but then, how is a miracle a revelation of any thing more than what is contained in the miracle itself? This is what I cannot see, but I shall have occasion to say more on this subject hereafter. It will be needless for me to object to the inferences drawn from miracles until a miracle is proven.
"If a man absolutely knows something of which I am ignorant, and informs me of it, it makes no difference to me how he come by his knowledge--it is revelation to me. It may not be divine revelation; but supposing it is, or is not, in either case, how am I to believe? Is it any thing that will admit of mathematical demonstration? If so, I shall take up with nothing short of being convinced in this way. Is it any thing which he has discovered? If so, he must give me evidence of such a discovery. Is it something to which he was an eye witness? Then the truth to me, depends for the present, entirely on his credibility. I must be convinced in the first place that he was not deceived himself, and secondly, that he has no motive in deceiving me. And evidence equally conclusive must accompany the truth of divine revelation, or it ought not, nay more, it cannot, rationally be believed. But supposing that I am convinced of the truth, and therefore believe; and I relate the same to a third person; is it equally revelation to him as it was to me? Yes, it may be so considered, in one sense, at least, for it informs him of something of which he was before ignorant, as much so as it did me, but then the truth of the fact does not rest with him on equal testimony, and therefore he is more excusable if he does not believe. If, however, he can believe all that I believe, and in addition to that, believe also in _me_, then, and not till then, he will become a believer in the same truth. But if he even suspects my veracity, it weakens in his mind, all the other testimony; and though he may still believe in the main proposition, yet he believes with less strength of evidence.