This case presents a single question, which is involved in the construction of the statutes governing the District of Columbia. That question is, Under that statute may a wife bring an action to recover damages for an assault and battery upon her person by the husband?

The declaration of the plaintiff is in the ordinary form, and in seven counts charges divers assaults upon her person by her husband, the defendant, for which the wife seeks to recover damages in the sum of $70,000. An issue of law being made by demurrer to the defendant's pleas, the supreme court of the District of Columbia held that such action would not lie under the statute. Upon writ of error to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, the judgment of the supreme court was affirmed. 31 App. D. C. 557, —L.R.A.(N.S.) --, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 879.

Thompson v. Thompson (218 U.S. 611)/Opinion of the Court

At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one, the legal existence of the wife during coverture being merged in that of the husband; and, generally speaking, the wife was incapable of making contracts, of acquiring property or disposing of the same without her husband's consent. They could not enter into contracts with each other, nor were they liable for torts committed by one against the other. In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of the wife, statutes have been passed in many of the states looking to the relief of a married woman from the disabilities imposed upon her as a feme covert by the common law. Under these laws she has been empowered to control and dispose of her own property free from the constraint of the husband, in many instances to carry on trade and business, and to deal with third persons as though she were a single woman. The wife has further been enabled by the passage of such statutes to sue for trespass upon her rights in property, and to protect the security of her person against the wrongs and assaults of other.

Thompson v. Thompson (218 U.S. 611)/Opinion of the Court

It is unnecessary to review these statutes in detail. Their obvious purpose is, in some respects, to treat the wife as a feme sole, and to a large extent to alter the common-law theory of the unity of husband and wife. These statutes, passed in pursuance of the general policy of emancipation of the wife from the husband's control, differ in terms, and are to be construed with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose which led to their enactment.

Thompson v. Thompson (218 U.S. 611)/Opinion of the Court

It is insisted that the Code of the District of Columbia has gone so far in the direction of modifying the common-law relation of husband and wife as to give to her an action against him for torts committed by him upon her person or property. The answer to this contention depends upon a construction of § 1155 of the District of Columbia Code. [31 Stat. at L. 1374, chap. 854.] That section provides:

'Sec. 1155. Power of wife to trade and to sue and be sued. Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to contract, whether engaged in business or not, and to sue separately upon their contracts, and also to sue separately for the recovery, security, or protection of their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may also be sued separately upon their contracts, whether made before or during marriage, and for wrongs independent of contract, committed by them before or during their marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried; and upon judgments recovered against them execution may be issued as if they were unmarried; nor shall any husband be liable upon any contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort committed separately by her out of his presence, without his participation or sanction: Provided, That no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.'