[Footnote 118: I do not think this can be found in any writings of Plato that have come down to us. Hippolytus probably took it from Aristotle, to whom he also attributes it; but I cannot find it in this writer either. A passage in Arist., _Nicomachean Ethics_, Book II, c. 6, is the nearest to it.]

[Footnote 119: So Alcinous, c. 29. The other statements in this sentence seem to be Aristotle’s rather than Plato’s. Cf. Diog. Laert., V, _vit. Arist._, c. 13, where he describes the good things of the soul, the body and of external things respectively.]

Philosophumena, Volume I — Part 49

[Footnote 123: _Ibid._, c. 26. The passage about the choice [of virtue] is in the _Republic_, X, 617 C. Hippolytus had evidently not read the original, which says that according as a man does or does not choose virtue, so he will have more or less of it.]

Philosophumena, Volume I — Part 49

[Footnote 125: This passage is not in the _Republic_, but in the _Clitopho_, as to Plato’s authorship of which there are doubts. Cruice quotes the Greek text from Roeper in a note on p. 38 of his text.]

Philosophumena, Volume I — Part 49

[Footnote 128: “Substance” (οὐσία) and “accident” (συμβεβηκός) are defined by Aristotle in the _Metaphysica_, Bk. IV, cc. 8, 9 respectively. The definitions in no way bear the interpretation that Hippolytus here puts on them. In the _Categories_, which, whether by Aristotle or not, are not referred to by him in any of his extant works, it is said (c. 4) that “of things in complex enunciated, each signifies _either_ Substance or Quantity, or Quality or Relation, or Where or When, or Position, or Possession, or Action, or Passion.” It is from this that Hippolytus probably took the statement in our text. The illustrations are in part found in _Metaphysica_, c. 4.]

[Footnote 129: The famous “Quintessence.” So Aetius, _De Plac. Phil._, Bk. I, c. 1, § 38. But see Diog. Laert. in next note.]

[Footnote 130: This is practically _verbatim_ from Diog. Laert., V, _vit. Arist._, c. 13.]

[Footnote 131: Hippolytus gives as is usual with him a more detailed account of Aristotle’s doctrines on these points later. (See Book VII, II, pp. 62 ff. _infra_.) He there admits that he cannot say exactly what was Aristotle’s doctrine about the soul. He also refers to books of Aristotle on Providence and the like which, _teste_ Cruice, no longer exist. Cf. Macmahon’s note on same page (p. 272 of Clark’s edition).]