The case turns upon the construction of the contract and its alleged conflict with § 2262, Rev. Stat., the pertinent part of which is:
'Before any person claiming the benefit of this chapter is allowed to enter lands, he shall make oath before the receiver or register of the land district in which the land is situated. . . . That he has not settled upon and improved such land to sell the same on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use; and that he has not, directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way or manner, with any person whatsoever, by which the title which he might acquire from the government of the United States should inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any person except himself.'
The defendants in error insist that the title was to be in no manner affected by the contract; that it was simply a promise on the part of the pre-emptor to pay a certain sum of money, the amount thereof to be determined by the proceeds of a sale which he might subsequently make; that he was under no obligations to make any sale, and, if he did not, they would have no claim upon him. On the other hand, the plaintiff in error invokes the doctrine laid down in Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 34 L. ed. 272, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, that, by the terms of the contract, the title which he acquired from the government was in part to inure, indirectly, at least to the other parties to the contract. He insists that the purpose of Congress was to secure to the pre-emptor the full benefit of the property patented to him; that this purpose is emphasized by the use of the words 'directly or indirectly;' and that any contract by which third parties were to acquire a portion of the property or a share in the proceeds of any sale of the property was really a contract which operated indirectly to transfer the title in part of such third party. Under such construction a contract by which the pre-emptor should agree to mortgage the land after acquiring title would be void, because, on failure to pay, and by foreclosure of the mortgage, the mortgagee might acquire title.
The question is not free from doubt. The contract did not directly affect the title; that was to be absolutely vested in the patentee, undisturbed by any claim of the defendants in error. He was not bound to do anything by which any portion of the title should pass to them, directly or indirectly. On the other hand, its effect was to cast a limitation on the full benefit of the property, for, while the patentee was under no obligation to sell, he was required to divide the proceeds if and when he made a sale.
It may be well to examine the decisions of the courts, Federal as well as state, and also the rulings of the Land Department. Before doing so, however, we quote the corresponding provisions of the Federal statutes respecting homesteads. Rev. Stat. §§ 2290, 2291, and 2295, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1389, 1390, 1398. In his application for a homestead entry the applicant must make affidavit that his 'application is made for his exclusive use and benefit, and that his entry is made for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not either directly or indirectly for the use or benefit of any other person.' And before a certificate or patent is issued he must make affidavit 'that no part of such land has been alienated, except as provided in section 2288 (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 1385).' That section refers to the transfer for church, cemetery, or school purposes, or for the right of way of railroads. The land shall not 'in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor.' [Rev. Stat. § 2296, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 1398.]
Under these provisions it has been held that a contract to convey the whole or part of the land, made prior to the perfection of his equitable right, by one seeking pre-emption or a homestead, is void, will not be enforced in the courts (Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 34 L. ed. 272, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905), and, if known to the Department, will prevent the passing of the legal title. Such has been the uniform ruling of the Land Department, as well as of the courts, state and Federal.