We are called upon in this case to remove ambiguities from a previous opinion which, while clear enough to the trial court, appears to have conveyed a triplicity of meaning to the Court of Appeals. A year ago Accardi was here contestng the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he attacked the refusal of the Board of Immigration Appeals to grant his application for suspension of deportation. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 1954, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681. The sole foundation of his claim was that 'the Attorney General (is doing) precisely what the regulations forbid him to do: dictating the Board's decision.' 347 U.S. 260, at page 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, at page 503. We remanded the petition to the trial court for a hearing on the question of 'the Board's alleged failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to existing valid regulations.' It was alleged on information and belief that the Attorney General had prepared prior to the Board's decision 'a list of one hundred individuals whose deportation he sought * * *' as 'unsavory characters'; that Accardi's name was among the group; and that the 'list * * * was circulated by the Department of Justice among all of its employees connected with the Immigration Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals' with the result that 'since that time it has been impossible for (Accardi) to secure fair consideration of his case.' We concludd that, if Accardi could prove that the Board had not exercised its own discretion in the matter, he should receive 'a new hearing before the Board without the burden of previous proscription by the list.'
On the remand, the District Court, after a full hearing, found that the Board members 'reached their individual and collective decision on the merits, free from any dictation or suggestion * * *' and again dismissed the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting, 219 F.2d 77, 80. The opinion of the court based its conclusion on the ground that the 'Attorney General's statements (had) unconsciously influence(d) the Board members so that they felt obliged not to exercise their discretion and, without doing so, to decide against Accardi.' The chief judge concurring in the result, thought that our prior opinion merely required Accardi to prove 'that there was a list as alleged, that he was on it, and that this fact was known to the Board.' The dissenting judge, on the other hand, read our opinion as meaning 'no more * * * than that (Accardi's) allegations sufficiently charged 'dictation' by the Attorney General,' entitling Accardi to a hearing on the question of 'whether the Board's denial of discretionary relief represented its own untrammelled decision or one dictated by the Attorney General.' Page 90. He concluded that the finding of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous. We agree with the dissenting judge both as to the interpretation of our prior opinion and its application to the facts of this case.