_Choice of Troops for the Second Line._—This line being subject to the severe trial of bombardment and of the rifle fire directed on the first line sweeping the ground behind, and being obliged to act with as much decision as the troops of the first line, it should be particularly well officered and be composed of troops of excellent spirit; now it often happens that less reliable troops are placed in this line, and far from pushing the first line forward, they stop short of it.
_Location of the Troops of the Second Line. The Moment for Putting Them in Action._—During the preparation, the troops of the second line await their turn in the shelters which open into the approach _boyaux_. It would be very advantageous if they could be placed as close as possible to the parallel of departure[11] in order to profit from the more or less complete protection against hostile artillery fire which comes from being close to the hostile trenches; but in general this will not be possible, except where the German and French trenches are separated by a considerable distance; in this case, there will be enough space between the parallel of departure and the old trench to install several support trenches.
When the first line has entirely departed, the units of the second line take their place in the parallel of departure and form there. _While not waiting there too long, it is absolutely necessary that the second-line troops entirely separate their effort from the effort of the troops preceding them._ They should start forward when the latter have almost taken the first zone of defense. A premature departure would mix their action with that of the first waves, and they would be absorbed in the same combat. Thus prematurely consumed and broken up, they would be incapable of continuing their action and would add nothing to the effort of the preceding troops.
_Taking the Formation for Combat._—The units of the second line should take their combat formation from the parallel of departure and from there be oriented on a well fixed objective; in fact, they risk coming unexpectedly under fire and should be ready for it at any time. There is, moreover, a reason of a moral order for it, which has been very often tested out. When taking the formation for combat, that is to say, when getting ready to fight the enemy before even having seen him, it seems that each one becomes imbued with a cold and silent resolution, which is alone irresistible. Taking formation under the pressure of danger, however, seems more like a check, and there comes out of it a demoralizing sensation of sudden fear and disorder.