This appeal brings here for review an order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina prohibiting the further prosecution of a bill in equity seeking the appointment of a receiver for the Central Union Bank. An Act of the General Assembly approved March 9, 1933 (38 St. at Large S.C. p. 1174), was held to forbid the maintenance of the proceeding. The appellant, who was plaintiff in the suit asserts that the act impairs the obligation of contract in violation of the Constitution of the United States. We cannot consider this contention since in his pleading the appellant relied solely on the provisions of the state Constitution (art. 1, § 8) with respect to the obligation of contracts, and made no reference to section 10, of article 1 of the Federal Constitution; and the Supreme Court, in disposing of the case, did not mention or discuss that section. Rev. St. § 709, U.S.C. tit. 28, § 344 (28 USCA § 344) Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Chicago, 164 U.S. 454, 457, 17 S.Ct. 129, 41 L.Ed. 511; Levy v. Superior Court, 167 U.S. 175, 177, 17 S.Ct. 769, 42 L.Ed. 126; Miller v. Cornwall Railroad Co., 168 U.S. 131, 134, 18 S.Ct. 34, 42 L.Ed. 409; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U.S. 658, 665, 34 S.Ct. 769, 58 L.Ed. 1141.
The statute was also assailed below and is challenged here as depriving the appellant of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A brief statement of the facts is requisite to an understanding of appellant's argument. Prior to March 9, 1933, the statutory provision as to state banks was, in summary, this: A state official, known as a bank examiner, had general supervision of the operation of these institutions. If a bank became embarrassed or insolvent he might, upon an order of a court, take possession of the assets and business for a period of thirty days, during which time no suits could be brought against the bank. He might restore the bank to the management of its officers, or, if liquidation were required, apply to a court for the appointment of himself or another as receiver. The affairs of the bank were then to be liquidated by the receiver under the suppervision of the court. Stockholders were liable to creditors other than depositors only to the extent of any unpaid balance on their shares; but to depositors, in an amount equal to the face value of their shares. It was the duty of the receiver to demand and collect for the benefit of creditors and depositors the amount due from stockholders, and, if necessary, to sue the stockholders individually and collectively therefor.