This action was instituted by petitioner in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The principal relief sought is a declaration that petitioner's removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid. Prior to trial, the District Court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment was affirmed, one judge dissenting, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, relying on its decision in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, sustained here by an equally divided vote, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669, 95 L.Ed. 1352. We granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 882, 75 S.Ct. 124, because the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left unresolved by this Court's action in Bailey v. Richardson, supra.
The basic facts are undisputed. Petitioner is a professor of medicine, specializing in the study of metabolism, at Yale University. For several years prior to 1953, because of his eminence in the field of medical science, he was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency. On April 10, 1953, the functions of the Federal Security Agency were transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, headed by respondent Hobby. Petitioner's duties required his presence in Washington from four to ten days each year, when called upon by the Surgeon General, to render advice concerning proposals to grant federal assistance to various medical research institutions. This work was not of a confidential or sensitive character and did not entail access to classified material. Petitioner was compensated at a specified per diem rate for days actually worked. At the time of his removal, petitioner was employed under an appointment expiring on December 31, 1953.
On March 21, 1947, Executive Order 9835 was issued by the President. It provided that the head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch of the Government 'shall be personally responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency.' Toward that end, the Order directed the establishment within each department or agency of one or more loyalty boards 'for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee * * * on grounds relating to loyalty * * *.' The order also provided for the establishment of a central Loyalty Review Board in the Civil Service Commission. The Board, in addition to various supervisory functions, was authorized 'to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal * * * by the loyalty board of any department or agency * * *.' The standard for removal prescribed by the Order was whether, 'on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States.' This standard was amended on April 28, 1951. As amended, the standard to be applied was whether, "on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States."
In January 1949, Joseph E. McElvain, Chairman of the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty of the Federal Security Agency, notified petitioner that derogatory information relating to his loyalty had been received. Accompanying McElvain's letter was a detailed interrogatory relating to petitioner's associations and affiliations. Petitioner promptly completed the form and returned it. Shortly thereafter, McElvain advised petitioner that the Agency Board had determined that no reasonable grounds existed for belief that petitioner was disloyal.
In May 1951, following the amendment of the removal standard prescribed by Executive Order 9835, the Executive Seccretary of the Loyalty Review Board advised McElvain that petitioner's case should be reopened and readjudicated pursuant to the amended standard. Three months later, the Acting Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board informed McElvain that a panel of the Loyalty Review Board had considered petitioner's case and had recommended that it be remanded to the Agency Board for a hearing. Acting on the Loyalty Review Board's recommendation, McElvain sent petitioner a letter of charges. Sixteen charges were specified, relating to alleged membership in the Communist Party, sponsorship of certain petitions, affiliation with various organizations, and alleged association with Communists and Communist sympathizers. In his reply, made under oath, petitioner denied that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party and set forth information concerning the other charges.